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Gazing at Subculture with Lacan. (107 pp.)
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The works of Dick Hebdige and Ann Bolin provide two examples in which the
commodity form serves as a point of departure for the discussion of the meaning of
subculture. Although the subject matter of each work is radically different -- Hebdige's
study concentrates on the stylistic displays of British post - W.W.n youth subcultures
while Bolin focuses on cross-dressers in contemporary American society - both authors
find something more in the commodity form that enables them to describe subculture.
For Hebdige, commodities, when used as signifiers of identity, do not signal the
emergence of liberated subjects; they signal the reification of pre-existing categories of
identity. For Bolin the opposite is true; the commodity form can be used as a signifier to
construct different identities. By investigating these differing conceptions of the
commodity form and its place in the analysis of identity, we can question the role of the
commodity in our understanding of subjectivity. My concern is that scholarly efforts that
view the commodity form as a determining factor in the construction of identity have
wrongly depicted those who use commodities for self expression.
I will employ the psycho-analytic theory of Jaques Lacan to illustrate how both authors
miss, or pass over the subjectivity of those represented in their studies. It will become
apparent that both authors portray those who use commodities for the expression of
identity inaccurately due to an erroneous conception of the commodity form. Describing
how these texts result in an inaccurate portrayal of subjectivity allows for a discussion of
the recent theoretical debate surrounding representation in the social sciences to be
approached from a Lacanian perspective. It will be shown how Lacanian theory might
provide an avenue for future ethnographic research that circumvents the perceived crisis
of representation effecting contemporary anthropology.
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Chapter One:
Introduction to Dispute

As Dick Hebdige states, the meaning of subculture is always in dispute. “The
word ‘subculture’ is loaded down with mystery It suggests secrecy, Masonic oaths, an
underworld.’’(Hebdige1979:4) Its very existence seems to beg contradiction and
conflict, calling into question the customary repetitions and practices of daily life by
introducing difference where non is expected. As a result subculture has the capacity
to problematize the accepted and routinized occurrences of daily life. It problematizes
the cultural significance of such mundane acts as dressing or choosing a hair style,
adding an extra layer of significance to the daily rituals we all take part in. I say
subculture adds significance to the practices and objects of everyday life because in
subculture the quotidian appears displaced and deformed, begging interpretation. In
subculture practices and objects are continually “made to mean and mean
again”(Hebdige1979:3) as something different, something we don’t understand.
An example might be an encounter on the street with a punk or a cross-dresser.
We see a safety pin stabbed through someone’s cheek and worn as jewelry or the latest
Haute Couture being adorned and paraded down the street by a Latin man, illuminating
foreign desires within our midst. In these two instances everyday objects are being
placed in a context that challenges the accepted cultural use and meaning of the objects
themselves. The tendency is to develop an understanding of subculture by emphasizing
the role of volitional subjects who have chosen specific objects for the purpose of
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presenting themselves to the world as different. We look to the object and some
mysterious quality embedded within that might provide the key for unlocking the
meaning of subculture. We assume a certain degree of likeness to ourselves since in
many cases the difference expressed by subculture seems on the brink of being eclipsed
by similarity if it weren’t exaggerated. As a result the material objects, such as safety
pins and articles of clothing often become the focus of efforts directed towards
deciphering the meaning of subculture. And the fact that in contemporary society the
objects of subculture are commodities, the fascination and appeal of describing
subculture in terms of its material objects can be understood when given the legacy of
Karl Marx in the social sciences.
This thesis examines the work of Dick Hebdige and Anne Bolin, two efforts in
which the significance of the material objects presented to us by subculture guides their
exploration of subcultural subjectivity. I challenge their readings of subculture by
questioning the role of choice, volition, and the reading of significance into these
attributes by looking at the subjects themselves who are using commodities for self
expression. Although the subject matter of each work is radically different —
Hebdige’s study concentrates on the stylistic displays of British post - W.W.n youth
subcultures while Bolin focuses on cross-dressers in contemporary American society -their arguments share a common dependence on the commodity form. Both authors
find significance in the commodity form, enabling them to explain the experience as
well as the meaning of their subjects practices. As a result, the particular conception of
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the commodity form held by each author determines the image o f the subjects whose
lives are represented in these texts.
For Hebdige the commodity form cannot provide the means to transcend the
dominant ideology. Commodities, when used as signifiers of identity, cannot signal the
emergence of liberated subjects; they can only signal the reification of pre-existing
categories of identity. Bolin finds the opposite to be true. She finds new potential for
expressing one’s “self’ in the commodity and its surrounding aesthetic forms. For
Bolin commodity form can be used as a signifier to express differently constructed
identities. Such a conclusion posits the commodity as providing the means for the
emergence of transcendent subjectivities resistant to the dominant ideological structure.
By investigating these differing conceptions of the commodity form and its place in the
analysis of identity, we can question the role of the commodity in our understanding of
subjectivity. This leads to an analysis of the role of the commodity form in
ethnography. My concern is scholarly efforts that view the commodity form as a
determining factor in the construction of identity have wrongly depicted those who use
commodities for self expression.
Psycho-analysis, and in particular the work of Jaques Lacan, provides a
theoretical approach that explores the correlation between the commodity form and
subjectivity. Lacan advances a conception of the subject as emerging in language,
meaning that in Lacanian terms, to be is to be a “being-in-language”. We become
conscious in language, and as a result all our experiences are mediated by its influence.
As subjects we do not have access to reality due to the inability of language as a
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symbolic system to accurately and completely represent reality. We continually desire
and are continually cut off from unification with the real supposedly in existence but
hidden behind the signifiers of the real in language. This means all representations of
that real are infused with desire and cover over a lack. Such a conception of
representation poses a problem for both Hebdige and Bolin since both are claiming the
commodity form signifies a real. In Hebdige’s case the real signified by the commodity
form is the reality of capitalism’s social structure: for Bolin it is the reality of changes
in the form of identity and the intersubjective relationships of contemporary society.
A Lacanian reading of Hebdige and Bolin demands that we view their portrayals
of subculture as graphic representations taking place in language. This means the
desire of the author infuses the images of the other crafted by their texts. Desire, then,
and not the accurate representation of differences in subjectivity becoming the central
organizing principle of these studies. Such a recognition repositions the commodity
form in these texts, with the commodity becoming less a signifier of the other’s
subjectivity and more the hidden kernel around which the author has organized his or
her desire. Approaching Hebdige and Bolin’s work from this perspective serves as a
point of departure for the discussion of the commodity form’s position in ethnographic
research. After Lacan, no longer can commodities be viewed as essential signifiers of a
particular history nor as signifiers whose consumption provides the means for the
expression of difference. Rather, the commodity form must be viewed as a signifier
whose meaning is representative of desire. This means the magical qualities of the
commodity form do not come from something hidden within it as use-value, nor the
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social relationships expressed by its form, but from its position in a network of
signifiers arranged by desire.
This discussion of subjectivity and the location of the commodity form in
ethnography breaks down into four sections. The first section involves a critical
reading of Hebdige. Hebdige’s understanding of subculture will be challenged by
illustrating the moment desire prevents him from seeing his subjects. My reading relies
on the work of Joan Copjec whose work describes the relationship between the subject
and its representation in a visual field such as Hebdige’s text, from the Lacanian
perspective. Copjec’s work allows one to see that Hebdige finds something more in the
commodity form that causes him to miss, or pass over, subjectivity in his study of
subculture. As a result, the conclusion that punk style does not represent the
expression of subjectivities resistant to the ideology of society’s dominant is wrong.
The second section builds on the first, examining the construction and expression
of gender and sex as it is challenged by the “transgender” community. In this chapter I
engage Bolin’s work as I did Hebdige’s, showing how the conclusion that crossdressing produces liberated subjects is inaccurate. I will show that rather than resisting
our western binary conceptions of gender, Bolin’s articulation of cross dressing
produces subjects whose actions reify the categories she seeks to transcend. In this
section the work of Susan Willis will be used to describe how Bolin’s understanding of
the relationship between the commodity form, ideology, and the subject is inadequate
for her described task.
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The third section delves into Lacanian psycho-analytic theoiy. I will show how
Lacan’s description of the psycho-analytic symptom and the process through which
psycho-analytic procedure commences provides for an alternative reading of the
practice of cross-dressing. This discussion leads to an understanding of gender as a
sign and not as an object around which subjectivity is organized. This enables the
practice of cross-dressing to be understood as significant because of its infusion with
pleasure, not political importance. Removing the political element from our
understanding of cross-dressing places the significance of the act on the subject who
emerges as cross-dressed and not on the implications of their expressions.
The final section locates the above discussion in the larger debates revolving
around the politics of representation in anthropology. I will illustrate how Lacan’s
conception of the subject provides a theoretical perspective that enables the recent
crisis of representation in the social sciences to possibly be circumvented. This section
will end with a description of what a Lacanian ethnography might look like. In this
description the theoretical consideration necessary for conducting ethnographic
research in contemporary society will be addressed.
Due to the reliance on semiotics and Lacanian psycho-analytic theory the
vocabulary of this study tends to be obscure. It is helpful to know that when I use the
terms “sign”, “signifier”, and “signified”, I am using them as they were defined in the
work on semiology by Ferdinand de Sassaure. In this usage “signified” is used to
describe the actual object being represented by a symbol, known as the “signifier”. The
“sign” is the conceptual unit formed by the association of these two terms. In
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Saussure’s own words the sign is defined as follows: “The linguistic sign unites, not a
thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material
sound, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our
senses.’’(Saussure1959:149) Since this is not a linguistic study, but one that relies on
the insights of linguistics for the analysis of cultural forms, the signs I am dealing with
unite a concept and a visual image such as a commodity with the body.
The vocabulary of Lacanian psycho-analytic theoiy is too difficult to clarify in
advance. The best I can do is define and describe the meaning of Lacan’s terms as I
work with them in the body of this paper. Although obscure and seemingly
impenetrable the work of Lacan provides an alternati ve position that enables the
practices of subculture to be understood in a different and positive light that captures
the dynamics of the social processes that bring the spectacular and flamboyant displays
of subculture into existence.
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Chapter Two:
Viewing the Prison House Walls
Dick Hebdige begins Subcultures; the Meaning of Style with a discussion of Jean
Genet the notorious French outlaw, homosexual, and artist. Hebdige draws a graphic
description of how common everyday items are imbued with meaning from Genet’s
work, The Thief s Journal. Or, in Hebdige’s own words, a description of how things
are made to “mean and mean again as ‘style’ in subculture”.(Hebdigel979:3) The
passage from Genet referred to by Hebdige involves the discovery of a tube of Vaseline
by the Spanish Police during a raid on Genet’s flat. As Hebdige states, “This ‘dirty,
wretched object’, proclaimed his [Genet’s] homosexuality to the
world.”(Hebdigel979:l) The importance of this tube of Vaseline for both Genet and
Hebdige is its capability to act as a sign, a sign that carrying two different meanings.
At one level Genet’s tube of Vaseline serves as an object signifying his illegal
sexuality; an object whose possession opens him to the derision and moral outrages of a
society that bars homosexuality. On a different level it serves as a sign of resistance
and strength for its owner for, after being subjected to the “hostile innuendo” of the
police during his arrest, the Vaseline took on a life of its own. In the possession of the
police the Vaseline served as a trace - as a constant reminder of an illicit world of
unknown pleasures and secret identities slipping through the grasp of authority. So
when Genet states, “I would indeed rather have shed blood than repudiate that silly
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object”(Genet in Hebdigel979:3), he is referring to the power of the object to act as a
sign. Genet further reveals the power of the sign in the following passage.
I was sure that this puny and most humble object would hold its own against them; by its
mere presence it would be able to exasperate all the police in the world; it would draw
upon itself contempt, hatred, white and dumb rages.(Genet in Hebdigel979:2)

This may seem a strange place to begin a discussion of subcultures but the
experience of Genet deriving power and emotional sustenance from his tube of
Vaseline while lying imprisoned for crimes against “nature” and “morality” describes
the meaning and experience of subculture for Hebdige. The image of the prison, of the
prisoner, of the everyday item, and of the ability of a sign to challenge the laws of those
who define it lies at the heart of Hebdige’s study. For, in the end Hebdige finds the
constructions of subcultures, although spectacular and flamboyant in their expressions
of resistance and refusal, to be nothing more than, “The darker side of sets of
regulations, just so much graffiti on a prison wall.”(Hebdigel979:3) For Hebdige
subcultures signal difference, identities of refusal standing in opposition to the
‘straight’ world; but in the end those who challenge the “natural” laws and codes of
“decency” lie imprisoned by the reality from which they seek to challenge and free
themselves. To decipher why this might be involves unpacking Hebdige’s text,
revealing his work to be just as much about ideology as it is about identity and just as
much about commodities as it is about subjectivity. This project begins with a
question, asking; What is the cause of Hebdige’s conclusion that subcultural
expressions are nothing more than the subordinate, c“Make(ing) something out of what
■ made r f t t a n K S t * in Hebdigel979:139) And fl* answer to the question iies in
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Barthes’ conception of semiotics and Althusser’s understanding of ideology, the
launching point of Hebdige’s analysis of subcultures.
In Subcultures. Hebdige develops a complex argument geared towards
understanding identity, the subversive potential of subcultures, and the expression of
difference through an analysis of style in youth subculture. Hebdige develops his
argument in light o f Roland Bathes’ work in semiotics outlining the presence of
ideology in everyday cultural occurrences. What is interesting about Barthes work is
his lack of concern for discerning the good from the bad in mass cultural forms. In
Mythologies, the work from which Hebdige draws his understanding of subcultures,
Barthes devotes himself to explaining how the occurrences of everyday life in a class
bound society are made to seem “perfectly natural”. A prime example of Barthes
concern might be our response to professional wrestling on television. When we turn
on the television we hardly think twice about huge men dressed as super heroes
performing a choreographed piece of violence.1 Rather we take a bemused note, ignore
the cultural messages and themes expressed by the performance, and, maybe, turn the
channel. This response for Barthes signals the ability of ideology to hide its operations
within and behind the form of everyday cultural occurrences. Rather than causing
immediate concern and reflection upon the origins and meaning of cultural forms the
televised wrestling match denies discussion of its origins, marking the most insidious

1 The form o f wrestling matches was o f interest to Barthes due to their comic book depiction o f our cultural
conceptions o f good and evil. According to Barthes, in a professional wrestling match, the forces o f good
and evil duke it, revealing the necessity o f specific cultural values to triumph over alternatives. So in
choosing the professional wrestling as an example, I am not only illustrating Barthes work, but drawing from
it as well.
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aspect of ideology, the capacity to make the obvious practices and interests of a
dominant group appear “perfectly natural” and normal.
For Barthes the apparent normalcy of everyday life is dependent upon
mythologies, or stories understood as true and beyond questioning. We understand
cultural occurrences, such as contact with the world of professional wrestling, as
perfectly natural due to a mythology that explains certain cultural forms and behaviors
as “given”. Men dressed as super heroes throwing each other around in mock displays
o f violence are explained in common sensical terms, as a natural propensity for
violence in males or as entertainment “needs” being met by the laws of supply and
demand. What these explanations miss is the cultural messages expressed by the form
such entertainments take. Only upon reflection do we realize that televised wrestling
matches speak to us in a moralizing tone, defining the perseverance of “good” cultural
values over evil.2
When the appearance of a specific conglomeration of signs, such as professional
wrestling matches, are understood as being “perfectly natural”, or when behaviors and
practices are performed without question, a mythology is in place. Mythologies are
given currency by cultural forms that reify the message and the reality of those whose
practices society has appropriated as the norm. “Mythology” carries out the work of
ideology by disseminating a seamless picture of “natural” social relation over our
everyday experience. In other words, the specific conventions and social practices of a
dominant group are objectified in cultural forms manufactured to present the specifics

2 For an in depth analysis o f televised wrestling see Barthes 1957,
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of social interaction within an alienated social order as the generalized experience of
all humanity.(see Horkheimenl968) The result is the fabrication of complex
semiological systems whose messages tell us exactly how normal the peculiar is. Mass
cultural forms such as film, fashion, and cuisine are part of this ‘second order
semiological system’ expressing the ‘artificial nature’ of social relations in a rhetoric of
common sense -- a rhetoric that hides the historicity and meanings of the rituals
performed in contemporary society.

Signifier

|

Signified

Language
Sign
Signifier

Signified

Sign

(Figure 1. Bathes Understanding o f Mythology)

The example Hebdige uses to illustrate Barthes concern over our “manufactured
sense” is Barthes analysis of a photograph taken of a French soldier saluting the flag.
The picture appeared on the cover of a French magazine, called Paris-Match, and
expresses the multiple layers of significance that overlay all apparently normal cultural
form. By following Barthes “reading” of the photograph the capacity of semiotics to
reveal the hidden ideological messages contained within the “perfectly natural”
occurrence of a soldier saluting the flag is disclosed. For Barthes the meaning of the
photograph is readily apparent in the image; the picture in question depicts a man
showing respect for his country, the military, and French nationalism. The second
order of meaning signified by the same image is, “that France is a great empire, that all
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her sons, without any color discrimination, (the pictured soldier is black) faithfully
serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged
colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called
oppressors. "(Barthes1957:116)
In Barthes secondary reading we see the ideological underpinnings informing our
everyday experience exposed. We see the photograph as expressing a blatantly
political message overlain by a systematically organized set of rules and codes that
bring the political message into discourse, but in such a way that “forbids talking”
about the origins and meaning of the image’s content. The secondary “connotated”
meaning of the image is not readily apparent because a mythology hiding the historical
origins of the image is in place. As a result, the image serves the political purpose of
establishing the reality of the dominant as the status quo. We do not question the
historical reasons for the content or the appearance of the image, rather common sense
says: the army is racially mixed, people in the army salute, the person in the picture is a
soldier, so of course he salutes the flag. This process of “reading” the representations
of everyday experience, developed by Barthes, shows “how all the apparently
spontaneous forms and rituals of contemporary societies are subject to a systematic
distortion, liable at any moment to be de-historicized, ‘naturalized’, converted into
myth.”(Hebdigel979:9) It then becomes the semiotician’s task to unravel the common
ideological core hidden behind all cultural forms and it is this desire that guides
Hebdige’s analysis of subculture.
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Hebdige is able to peer beneath ‘mythology’ at the hidden codes and conventions
of such secondary semiologic systems as Rastafarian or Punk style due to Barthes’
conception o f the sign. The particulars of Barthes’ conceptualization of the sign are
important to our understanding of Hebdige’s work since they not only bring Hebdige to
his topic, but graphically define the subjects of his analysis. In fact, it is safe to say, the
image of subculture painted by Hebdige’s analysis is symptomatic of Barthes’
articulation of the sign. In order to fully understand the cause of Hebdige’s analysis,
Barthes conception of the sign must be unpacked. And the process of unpacking the
contents of the sign begins with a dozen roses.
The example Barthes uses to describe the constituent parts of a sign is a bunch of
roses. As Barthes states:
Take a bunch o f roses: I use it to signify my passion. Do we have here, then, only a
signifier and a signified, the roses and my passion? Not even that: to put it accurately,
there are here only ‘passionified’ roses. But on the plane o f analysis, we do have three
terms; for those roses weighted with passion perfectly and correctly allow themselves to
be decomposed into roses and passion: the former and the latter existing before uniting
and forming this third object, which is the sign. It is as true to say that on the plane of
experience I cannot confiise the rose from the message they carry, as to say that on the
plane o f analysis I cannot confuse the roses as signifier and the roses as sign: the signifier
is empty, the sign is full, it is a meaning.(Barthesl957:113)

What is immediately apparent is that Barthes’ sign is made of three constituent parts.
“There is the signifier, the signified and the sign, which is the associative total of the
two terms.”(Barthes:113;l957) The signified is the material object, in our case
identity, the signifier is the visual representation of that object, and the sign is the
meaning associated with the two. Or to return to Genet, the signifier is the tube of
Vaseline, the signified: Genet’s homosexuality, and the sign: knowledge of the illicit
world of criminality and pleasure existing beyond the grasp of authority. The most
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important aspect of Barthes’ semiotics is how he sees the sign connecting the signifier
with the signified, for it is here that ideology takes hold and dictates knowledge in the
form of mythology.
To describe the relationship between the signifier, signified and the sign, Barthes
uses the work of Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure whose work emphasizes the
arbitrary nature of the sign. For Saussure, as well as Barthes, there is no necessary
connection between the signifier and the signified. The connection between these two
constituent parts is one of social convention and not of essence. The semiological
system in which the signifier “Tree” is made to stand in for the material object
associated with that signifier is one of convention and supersedes the control of any one
individual. One learns a semiologic system such as language, one does not invent it as
he or she go. Barthes states that, “The signified is the concept, the signifier is the
acoustic image (which is mental) and the relationship between concept and image is the
sign. ’’(Barthes: 113; 1957)
Although Saussure’s original articulation of the sign was developed as a
methodology for linguistic analysis, Barthes extends Saussure’s idea of semiologic
systems to include all systems of formal logic; hence the potential of semiotics as a tool
for cultural analysis. Rather than dealing strictly with language Barthes deals with
discourse, or the study of “ideas-in-form”; Barthes seeks knowledge of the form in
which ideas are presented and re-presented in different cultural instances. Re
presentation is the realm of mythology and is of particular importance since in this
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secondary realm, not only are things made to “mean and mean again”, but disparate
objects are made to signify and signify again the same thing, a unified historical reality.
The nature of the mythical signification can in fact be well conveyed by one particular
simile: it is neither more nor less arbitrary than an ideograph. Myth is a pure ideographic
system where the forms are still motivated by the concept which they represent while not
yet, by a long way, covering the sum o f its possibilities for
representation.(Barthesl957:127)

At this point we can return to Hebdige and begin describing how Barthes’ work
acts as a determinant in Hebdige’s understanding of subculture. What is immediately
apparent is that Barthes’ work informed the very location of Hebdige’s analysis.
Hebdige’s work concentrates on subcultural style, or the form in which identity is
presented. Hebdige hopes to glean knowledge of the interaction between society’s
dominant and subordinate groups by analyzing the sartorial displays of subculture.
This is possible due to the capacity of sartorial displays to act as an ideographic
representation of social life. Hebdige illustrates this point by referring again to Genet:
“For, just as the conflict between Genet’s ‘unnatural’ sexuality and the policemen’s
‘legitimate’ outrage can be encapsulated in a single object, so the tensions between
dominant and subordinate groups can be found reflected in the surfaces of subculture in the styles made up of mundane objects which have a double
meaning.”(Hebdigel979:2) Literally in the clothing of subculture Hebdige finds the
tensions between the dominant and subordinate groups to be ‘writ large’ in the
language o f a Barthian second order semiological system, in which the chimerical
objects used to express difference - “a safety pin, a pointed shoe, a motor cycle” - are
found to express identity. But it is an impotent identity. In the end Hebdige finds Punk
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style to signify difference, but the sign fails to break free from the universalizing
tendencies of mythology. Rather, Punk style remains a surface phenomenon signifying,
and signifying again, difference, but a difference continually falling short of the “self
imposed exile” sought by subculture members. Mythology continually captures and
recaptures the motivated efforts of subcultural members who, according to Hebdige are
tyring to break free from the universalizing discourse of society’s dominant.
Perhaps the clearest example of subculture’s impotence is seen in Hebdige’s
description of Punk style as “white ethnicity”. In the following passage Hebdige
contrasts the development of reggae and urban black style with that of Punk. The
conclusion drawn by Hebdige is that Punk style does not express a positive alternative
identity resistant to the historical reality of the dominant. Rather, the signifiers
activated by the Punks form a sign expressing the subculture’s “true colors” as “lifers
in solitaiy despite the fierce tattoos.”(Hebdigel979:66) This argument is based on
Barthes’ conceptualization of the sign and its relation to ideology. For, as Hebdige
makes clear, the location in which the Punks sought to ground their alternative identity
had no historic precedent. Punks sought to ground their identity in the land of
commodities and this land was already claimed by the mythology of the dominant.
Whereas urban black youth could place themselves through reggae ‘beyond the pale’ in an
imagined elsewhere (Africa, or the West Indies) the punks were tied to present time. They
were bound to Britain which had no foreseeable future. But this difference could be
magically elided. By a simple sleight of hand, the co-ordinates o f time and place could be
dissolved, transcended, converted into signs. Thus it was that the punks turned towards
the world a dead white face which was there and yet not ‘there’. Like the myths of
Roland Barthes, these ‘murdered victims’ -emptied and inert - also had an alibi, an
elsewhere, literally ‘made up’ out o f Vaseline and cosmetics, hair dye and mascara. But
paradoxically, b the case of the punks, this ‘elsewhere’ was also a nowhere - a twilight
zone - a zone constituted out o f negativity. Like Andre’ Breton’s Dada, punk might seem
to ‘open all the doors’ but these doors ‘gave onto a circular corridor’. They reflected b a
heightened form a percieved condition: a condition of unmitigated exile, voluntarily
assumed. But whereas exile had a specific meaning, implied (albeit magical) solution b
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the context of Rastafarianism and Negro history, when applied metaphorically to British
white youth it could only delineate a hopeless condition. (Hebdigel979:65)3

The signs of identity used by Punks are commodities and commodities, for Hebdige,
are always already tied into a secondary semiologic system that serves as a tool of
normalization for the dominant. And, in Hebdige’s mind, a historical and geographic
origin can not be based upon a cultural form that is already de-historicized and whose
appearance “forbids talking” about its origins. So by using a commodity as a signifier
of identity one is not challenging the status quoe but reifying the social reality from
which emancipation is sought. It is in this way that subcultures are “just so much
graffiti on a prison wall”.(Hebdigel979:3)
It is important to investigate this relationship between identity, ideology, and the
commodity form since it is the nature of this relationship that allows Hebdige to unlock
the message of subcultural style. It might even be said that this time-worn tripartite is
the hinge on which all of Hebdige’s text hangs. In this case it is useful to push the
analogy of a door swinging on a hinge. A door swinging open describes discovery,
providing a description of gaining access to hidden worlds, while also describing
concealment, acting as a barricade as well. Hebdige’s conception of the commodity
form and its relationship to ideology opens a door that appears to provide a satisfactory
explanation of subculture but, upon close reflection, the door Hebdige opens conceals

3 An interesting side note to this passage concerns the treatment o f race by Hebdige. For Hebdige, due to
the racial element informing the development o f raggae, black urban subcultures express a positive identity
complete with geographical and historical underpinnings, but Britain “white” punks do not. The trace of
race that signals viable alterity exists in the skin and not on the surface o f a second order semiological
system. Although a Rastafarian in London may have no personal contact with the African continent or the
West Indies, the trace o f that history is in their skin.
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as much as it reveals. Hebdige’s door acts as much as a barricade as it does an
entryway, concealing the subjects of study as it reveals the desire of Hebdige as a
subject. With this said it is important to investigate the hinge, the mechanism upon
which Hebdige’s text depends, emphasizing the moment the door swings open just
enough to peer into the inner sanctum of a room but remains closed enough to conceal
the subject hiding behind the door that lies ajar. This discussion begins with Hebdige’s
conception of ideology and its relationship to the sign.
The definition of ideology used by Hebdige is a filtered version of Marx’s
definition established in The German Ideology. Stemming from an originary division
o f labor, ideology emphasizes the historical development of a false consciousness
paralleling the bourgeoisie’s rise to power. This “false consciousness” hides the true
economic and social structure of capitalism (i.e. one person’s profit is another’s unpaid
labor) behind the materialized ideals of bourgeois social life. Implied within this
definition is the existence of an objective and true set of social relations, a whole
society absent of alienation where humans can live out their species being. Hebdige’s
definition is a filtered version of the original because his work is informed by later
scholars, such as Althusser and Stuart Hall, who have bent Marx’s original conception
of ideology to fit the needs of understanding contemporary capitalist culture. Hall and
Althusser’s adjustments revolve around the relationship between power and the
formation of consciousness. Both authors push the influence of ideology behind the
conscious subject, locating its operation in the unconscious. In doing so the
conspiratorial aspect of culture was removed from the equation that describes such
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contemporary cultural forms as the structure of the modem family and political
institutions. With Hall’s and Althusser’s adjustments to Marx’s original definition, no
longer are the production and reproduction of specific social structures seen as
motivated efforts initiated by individuals whose best interest is served by the
dissemination of a specific message. Rather, ideology is seen as the embodiment of
form and structure. The relationship between ideology, the formation of consciousness,
and contemporary cultural forms is made clear by Althusser’s statement:
Ideology has very little to do with ‘consciousness’...It is profoundly
unconscious...Ideology is indeed a system o f representation, but in the majority of cases
these representations have nothing to do with ‘consciousness’: they are usually images and
occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast
majority o f men, not via their ‘consciousness’. They are perceived-accepted-suffered
cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them.
(Althusser in Hebdigel979:12)

What is important to recognize in this definition is the ubiquity of ideology. For
the above scholars where there is meaning, there too is ideology. Signification is
grounded in an ideological apparatus that connects the sign to the signified. This
translates into an understanding of culture as a repository of ideology with structure
being the embodiment of domination. If ideology is to be understood as a structural
component of everyday life, as existent in the “perceived-accepted-suffered” objects o f
culture, then cultural forms as well as their contents must be understood as being
saturated in ideology. Or, more simply, ideology can be understood as the “Semantic
rules and codes which are not directly apprehended in experience.”(Hebdigel979:13)
After we have discarded the notion of a “false consciousness” this new
conceptualization of ideology retains Marx’s original idea of a “true” and “whole” set
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of social relations hidden from view by the consciousness of the dominant. An
objective set of “real” social relations is always present and serving as the goal or
object of the “cultural studies” undertaken by these authors. Perhaps the clearest
example of the notion of an objective world of social relations hidden from view is
seen in Stuart Hall’s statement concerning the transparency of ideology which reads,
“You cannot learn, through common sense, how things are: you can only discover
where they fit into the existing scheme of things.’’(Hall in Hebdigel979:l 1) It is the
“how things are” out on the streets for the youth of Britain that Hebdige seeks through
his analysis of subculture, only rather than discovering “how things are”, he discovers
where things fit into the structure of class. In the end Hebdige reveals the content
hidden by the form but not the secret of the form itself. He does not reveal the secret of
experiencing class but rather reveals the hidden contents of ideology.
An analogy drawn from the work of Freud helps describe how Hebdige’s efforts
to produce a formal analysis of subcultures ends in a content analysis of ideology, with
subculture being part of the overall contents of our class bound society. In The
Interpretation of Dreams. Freud describes the theoretical considerations necessary to
avoid being fooled into believing that the hidden contents o f a dream have any use in
the analytic procedure. Rather, as Freud makes apparent, the secret to be revealed is in
the form itself. “The theoretical intelligence of the form of dreams does not consist in
penetrating the manifest content to its ‘hidden kernel’ of truth, the latent dreamthoughts; it consists in answering the question: why have the latent dream-thoughts
assumed such a form, why were they transposed into the form of a
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dream?”(Zizekl 989:11) The importance of moving away from a contents analysis of
form, understood by Freud, is described by Zizek as follows:
Herein, then lies the basic misunderstanding: if we seek the ‘secret o f the dream’ in the
latent content hidden by the manifest text, we are doomed to disappointment: all we find is
some entirely ‘normal’ - albeit usually unpleasant - thought, the nature o f which is mostly
non-sexual and definitely not ‘unconscious’. This ‘normal’, conscious/preconscious
thought is not drawn towards the unconscious, repressed simply because o f its
‘disagreeable’ character for the conscious, but because it achieves a kind o f ‘short circuit’
between it and another desire which is already repressed, located in the unconscious, a
desire which has nothing whatsoever to do with the ‘latent dream-thought. It is this
unconscious/sexual desire which cannot be reduced to a ‘normal train o f thought’ because
it is, from the very beginning, constituatively repressed (Freud’s Urverdrangung) - because
it has no ‘original in the ‘normal’ language o f everyday communication, I the syntax o f the
conscious/preconscious; its only place is in the mechanism o f the ‘primary
process’.(Zizekl989:13)

What Hebdige has done is to reveal the form ideology has taken in contemporary
society: class, penetrated one aspect of its manifest content (subculture) and revealed
the ‘hidden kernel’, that is the commodity form acting as a sign of the ideological
structure that produced it and its meaning. In other words, Hebdige concentrates on the
form of ideology, poses the correct questions, but fails to gain an understanding of why
class has taken the form it has in subculture. Hebdige has produced a text revealing the
contents of class while failing to explain “the way things are” for those who manifest
class. Class is posited as a pre-existing category ordering the enunciations of those
who speak with commodities. Hebdige’s dilemma is caused by his conception of
ideology which continually causes him to look for the “true” social relations hidden
behind the markers of identity, thus falling prey to a “fascination” with the contents of
ideology and missing the message expressed by its form, class, has taken. And perhaps
this explains the necessity of Hebdige’s apologetic disclaimer at the end of his book:
Thus, while Genet embodies our object most clearly, in the end Barthes is closest to us.
He understands the problems of the reader - ‘the mythologist’ who can no longer be one
with the ‘myth consumers’....The cord has been cut: we are cast in a marginal role. We
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are in society but not inside it, producing analyses o f popular culture which are themselves
anything but popular. We are condemned to a ‘theoretical sociality’ ‘in camera’ to the
text - caught between the object and our reading. The study of subcultural style which
seemed at the outset to draw us back towards the real world, to reunite us with ‘the
people’, ends by merely confirming the distance between the reader and the ‘text’,
between everyday life and the ‘mythologist’ whom it surrounds, fascinates and finally
excludes. It would seem that we are still, like Barthes ‘condemned for some time yet to
speak excessively about reality’.(Hebdigel979:140)

Upon first reading, Hebdige’s apology seems justified and clear. It seems obvious
he would want to apologize to his both his readers and those from whom the study
draws for the short-comings of his text. After all, as he points out, the book does
succumb “to a kind of romanticism”, straying from “the legitimate concerns of
sociologists”. It also seems obvious that he might offer apologies to those to whom he
turned for knowledge since he failed to produce a text in which they might recognize
themselves. But upon closer examination it becomes apparent that there is something
more going on in Hebdige’s apology, a something more that anticipates in advance a
certain lack covered over by his text. With this said let’s look at the apology closely;
for contained within Hebdige’s final sentimental sentences lies the “something more”
that causes knowledge of ‘how things are’ in subculture to slip from Hebdige’s grasp.
As it turns out this humble apology is crucial to the text. It contains the essence of
Althusser’s definition of ideology, providing the moment in which we can begin to
speak of subjectivity. Because within the final statements of the book we can see
Hebdige’s true relationship to the subjects of his study. In his apology Hebdige reveals
not only an unfulfilled desire but also the defining characteristics of his conception of
subculture - a conception that allows subjectivity to evade him.
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In order to understand how subjectivity evades Hebdige’s reading of style we
need to return to Althusser’s and Barthes’ understanding of ideology as its effects are
crystallized as a sign in Hebdige’s text. And that moment is when Hebdige states, “We
are condemned to a ‘theoretical sociality’ ‘in camera’ to the text - caught between the
object and our reading.’’(Hebdige1979:140) In this statement, unbeknownst to
Hebdige, he reveals the truth pertaining to his relationship to subculture and a lack in
his understanding of the subject that is covered over by the text. Even more relevant,
this statement comes as an apology.
When Hebdige makes the above claim he is describing the predicament of the
student of subculture. According to Hebdige, the researcher is condemned to a position
of marginality because their knowledge prevents them from “taking the apparent for
granted”. In other words, the researcher is denied fulfillment of the desire to live in the
world of his subjects - a world in which the structural component of domination
inherent to a class bound society has been resolved - due to the hidden kernel of truth,
known by the researcher, to reside in all mass cultural forms. The researcher is
prevented from experiencing the “magical solution” to the constraints of ideology lived
by Punks, Skinheads, and Rastafarians due to knowledge of mythology. Rather,
Hebdige feels a sense of condemnation to a life in “uneasy cerebral relation to the brica-brac of life”, with “the mundane forms and rituals whose function it is to make us
feel at home”(Hebdige1979:139) having the opposite effect. For the mythologist
‘myth-consumption’ signals anxiety and fear, revealing the worst nightmare of the
properly Marxist semiotician, the ‘arbitrary nature’ of everyday experience. The
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mythologist is cast into a marginal role to “straight” society as well as subculture due to
his or her knowledge of mythology and the operation of ideology in all cultural forms.
As Hebdige states, the marginality of the intellectual seems like a perfect place from
which to approach other fringe peoples, secure in our assurance of a common
experience between intellectual and outlaw, knowledge o f a world where everything
has significance, where everything reveals our position outside society. Semiotician,
Punks, and Genet: aliens in their own society, living a “self-imposed exile” where the
truths pertaining to the codes of society are continually revealed and subverted; we are
liberated, but not free. Aside from expressing a romantic sentimentality of the social
critic as a castigated and tortured soul, Hebdige, as an intellectual, gladly recognizes
himself reflected in this text, while the actual subjects of the study do not. Why might
this be, and why is this cause for apology? The answer to this question is difficult since
it involves a return to ideology and its effects on determining the subjects of this study.
In order to understand why subculture, as presented here, does not reflect back as
a self-identical image we need to turn to the work o f Joan Copjec whose work explains
the shortcomings of Althusser’s conception of ideology in terms of the Lacanian
definition of the subject. Her book is a critique of the contemporary efforts, such as
Foucault’s and Althusser’s, to historicize the emergence of the modem subject. Since
she is a Lacanian scholar her vocabulary is extremely obscure, so please bear with me.
Copjec begins her critique of Althusser by calling into question the “F’ which is
articulated as being situated “in camera” to the subject of study. According to Copjec
this position can be described as a process in which the “F’ of the subject is rendered
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visible by “the instrument through which...[the] I [is] photo-graphed.”(Copjecl994:31)4
What this statement means is that for Althusser, and Hebdige as well, “The gaze [of the
author] determines the complete visibility of the “F (Copjecl994:32), and the
theoretical apparatus, or ‘the camera’, used to view the subject determines our
perceptions of that “F . So when Hebdige states that he is “in camera” to the object of
his study, he is saying that his theoretical apparatus is literally mapping the “F he is
viewing. He is exposing and defining the desires and intentions of his subject as it
emerges through his analysis. Hebdige is telling the truth about subjects revealed by
the gaze of his theoretical apparatus, that is, subjects who do not recognize themselves
in that gaze. When given the nature of this relationship it becomes immediately
apparent why Hebdige feels the need to apologize. While Hebdige’s own theorizing
may place him in a marginal position to society, preventing him the fulfillment of
certain desires, his analysis objectifies his subjects in a gaze that reveals all except the
constructed position of the researcher’s gaze. What is at stake here is the relationship
between the self and the “other”, the self as mythologist, and the “other” as object of
the gaze, an object that is made visible through the gaze o f the self.
Hebdige seeks solace in the object that fails to recognize itself reflected in his
study. For Hebdige this mis-recognition equals the preservation of a safe haven in
which the “imaginary” solutions of subculture can continue without being “killed by
the kindness” of social scientists. However if the subject does not recognize itself in

4

Although this statement concerning the relationship between the I and the “camera” was originally made
by Lacan, Copjec is using this statement in her text to expose the erroneous assumptions pertaining to
subjectivity in Althusser’s conception of ideology.
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its image as it is represented in Hebdige’s text, the gaze assumes to be representing the
object of study as it actually is, as it has been constructed historically. Mis-recognition
by the subject operates at the level of ideology to produce ‘the camera’, and to imply an
error on the subject’s part but not on the theoretical apparatus of the researcher.
Copjec describes this process as the subject’s failure to properly recognize its true
relation to the visible world.(Copjec1994:32). As Copjec states its this process of
installing the subject in a position of misrecognition “operates without the hint of
failure.”(Copjecl994:32)
The subject unerringly assumes the position the perspectival construction bids it to take.
Erased from the process of construction, the negative force o f error emerges later as a
charge directed at the subject. But from where does it come? Film theory has described
only the construction o f this position o f misrecognition. Though it implies that there is
another actual, nonpunctiform, position, film theory has never been able to describe the
construction o f this position.(Copjecl994:33)

Hebdige raises a charge against the subjects of subculture because he perceives a
failure on their part to provide the desired freedom sought by the researcher. The
freedom Hebdige desires is characterized by the unification of the researcher with “the
people”. Such a union would signal the end the end of his alienation as an intellectual.
There is a fundamental problem with Hebdige’s conception of the subject. The subject
does not misrecognize itself in his gaze, a gaze which objectifies the subject. Rather, it
reveals the subject has actually evaded his gaze, and misrecognition is being leveled as
a charge against the subject of subculture. Hebdige is saying “silly punk, you just can’t
see the truth of your own actions.” The Lacanian reading of this mis-recognition sees
the subject viewing his or her representation, asking: “who me?” and replying no. The
subject has deceived Hebdige, revealing the flaw in his conception of the subjects he is
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studying as they slip out from underneath his gaze. Hebdige covers over this flawed
conception of the subject with the excessive meaning of the commodity form.
Lacan takes into consideration the deceptive capacity of the subject who refuses
to ignore the constructed nature of the “I” that exists “in camera” to itself. By
explaining the Lacanian conception of the relationship between self and other we can
see how Hebdige missed the subject. Rather than sparing the subject the subject spared
him, thus positing an entirely new meaning to the apologetic ending of the text. In
order to explain Lacan’s conception of the relationship between the self and other we
need to refer to that famous diagram of the two interpenetrating triangles.

The G aze <

im age
screen

The Subject
of R epresentation

(Figure 2. Diagram o f the Lacanian Gaze)

In the di agram, Lacan overlays two triangles in such a manner that the base lines
are parallel, with the apex of each separate triangle intersecting the mid-point of the
opposite triangles base-line. These two points at the apex of each triangle represent the
origin of the gaze as it is experienced by the subject of representation as well as the
author. At the mid point, where the vertical members of the two triangles intersect,
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Lacan has drawn a short line parallel to the base lines. This short center line represents
what Lacan calls the ‘image screen’, and is crucial to our understanding of the gaze,
and the misrecognition of the subject represented by that gaze.
In the Althusser/Hebdige model only one of these triangles is taken into
consideration. Thus, the subject revealed by Hebdige’s gaze is directly correlated to
the laws of optics in which the picture taken by “the camera” actually does reveal all,
producing what Copjec calls a “centered and transcendent subject.” In this way the self
misrecognition in its reflected image is a matter of ideology. The self does not
recognize its own image because ideology has warped the image of what the self looks
like to that self. This implies an actual position from which the constructed nature of
the self can be viewed absent of the refracting effects of ideology. For Lacan, on the
other hand, this misrecognition expresses a more profound internal dialectic in which
the subject mistakenly believes that a space exists beyond what is revealed by the gaze.
It is Lacan’s inclusion of the second triangle in which the subject of representation
looks back at the gaze that illustrates this point.
The second triangle diagrams the subject’s mistaken belief that there is something behind
the space set out by the first. [The graphic depiction of Althusser and Hebdige’s gaze] It
is this mistaken belief (this misrecognition) that causes the subject to disbelieve even those
representations shaped according to the scientific laws of optics. The Lacanian subject,
who may doubt the accuracy of even its most ‘scientific representations,’ is submitted to a
superegoic law that is radically different from the optic laws to which the film theoretical
subject is submitted.(Copjecl994:33)

The superegoic law to which Copjec refers is The Law of Signification, those
originary laws of language that establish the subject as a desiring being. For our
discussion of subculture, when Hebdige claims the misrecognition of the subject to be a
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product of ideology, an imaginary space in which the subject believes it is transcending
the laws of society, he is mistaken. Rather, the subject’s misrecognition of its “self’ is
a loop-hole in the symbolic that continually allows the subject to imagine a position
outside and beyond the imaginary in which it exists as a transcendent subject. Thus the
subject is never trapped in the imaginary because the imaginary always invites one to
imagine a position outside the perspective of the gaze establishing the representation.
This always present alternative position within the imaginary allows the subject to
continually evade the gaze, calling into question Hebdige’s claim that Punk style is
nothing more than “graffiti on prisons walls.” The prison walls which Hebdige sees
constructing the very being of his subjects are, for the Punks, nothing more than an
illusion, a graphic effect. They are not some terrible structure that can only be escaped
from in the imaginary. Or as Copjec explains,
Where the film-theoretical positions [of Althusser and Hebdige] always tends to trap the
subject in representation, to conceive of language as constructing the prison walls o f the
subject’s being, Lacan argues that the subject sees these walls as trompe I’oeii, and as
being constructed by something beyond them. For beyond everything that is displayed to
the subject, the question is asked, ‘What is being concealed from me? What in this graphic
space does not show, does not stop not writing itself.(Copjecl994:34)

From this discussion an alternative conception of the subject is offered by Lacan,
one which illustrates a radical authenticity to subculture missed in Hebdige’s text.
How does Lacan offer authenticity where Hebdige found a surface expression of style?
Lacan’s conception of the subject is beyond signification; it is a lack in the symbolic
system impossible to signify. To return our own gaze to the diagram described above,
we must also include the notion of the screen. For Lacan the idea of a screen upon
which the representation of the gaze is projected in a graphic presentation accounts for
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the subject’s misrecognition of itself in representation. In this case, Hebdige’s text acts
as the screen upon which the image of subculture captured by the theoretical camera is
represented. When confronted by this image, rather than seeing itself the subject sees
an image, an image from which it can immediately escape due to the possibility of
always imagining a different perspective from the one caught in the camera. At the
moment the subject intuits that something is missing from its image as it is represented
on the screen, and in Hebdige’s text, Lacan’s attention is captured. Lacan looks for that
which is not revealed, for that which is invisible in the graphic field, thus locating the
emergence of the subject in its representation as an impossibility. The subject is
always present in its absence, in the “unrealizable ideal” of the symbolic system to
signify reality. Copjec describes this strange contradiction as follows:
One would expect to find at the point o f the [Lacanian] gaze a signified, but here the
signifier is absent - and so is the subject. The subject, in short, cannot be located or locate
itself at the point o f the gaze, since this point marks its very annihilation. At the moment
the gaze is discerned, the image, the entire visual field, takes on a terrifying alterity. It
loses its ‘belong-to-me aspect’ and suddenly assumes the function o f a
screen.(Copjecl994:35)

So rather than seeing one’s self represented by a theoretical apparatus seeking to reveal
ones subjectivity, one sees a picture of oneself obviously taken from a particular
perspective that is not one’s own. Just as one never really believes the voice one hears
on the answering machine is the voice with which one speaks, or that their image
presented to them in a snap shot is what they actually look like, the subject never
believes its representation is its own. So if one is to look for the subject one does not
look for a signifier, one looks for an absence covered over by signification.
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This conception of the subject has a profound impact for our understanding of
subculture. If the signifiers of difference do not signify a subject occupying an identity
category then what are they doing? What is difference, and what is identity if we
cannot ground the signifier to an essential entity such as a body? The answer to these
question lies in the field of representation, because for Lacan, that is all there is; there
is nothing beyond the visual field of signifiers.
Lacan argues that beyond the signifying network, beyond the visual field, there is, in feet
nothing at all. The veil o f representation actually conceals nothing; there is nothing behind
representation....Lacan locates the cause of being in the inform: the unformed (that which
has no signified, no significant shape in the visual field) and the inquiry (the question posed
to representation’s presumed reticence). The subject is the effect o f the impossibility of
seeing what is lacking in the representation, what the subject, therefore, wants to see. The
gaze, the object-cause o f desire, is the object-cause of the subject o f desire in the field of
the visible.(Copjecl994:35)

Lacan’s conception of the subject allows us to see identity in exactly the ways Hebdige
prevents. From the Lacanian perspective identity is nothing more than a stylistic
arrangement in a visual field of desire. This visual field is not penetrable by a gaze,
“Not filled with knowledge or recognition; it is clouded and turned back on itself,
absorbed in its own enjoyment.”(Copjecl994:36) In this new light Hebdige’s apology
takes on a new significance. Rather than apologizing to his subjects out of a sense of
guilt for exposing them, Hebdige is apologizing, as he should, for his failure to allow
the subject to speak and thus reject his representation. When given the message these
subjects would have carried it is all too clear why Hebdige could not allow their voices
into his text. If Hebdige had listened to these subjects he would have to locating
himself in their gaze, and to do that would involve risking his own unified position as a
subject in his text. He would have to admit that he to was being gazed upon by subjects
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with the ability to dismantle the component parts of his identity. This is a risk he could
not take, for to do so would be to admit his own dissolution.
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Chapter Three:
Reification or Relief?

Another approach to the analysis of identity that involves the commodity form is
seen in the work of Ann Bolin. In ‘Transcending and Transgendering: Male-to-female
Transexuals, Dichotomy and Diversity’, an article from Gilbert Herdt’s edited volume
Third Sex, Third Gender, Bolin analyzes the practices of cross-dressers and
transsexuals. The intent is to evaluate the implications of these practices for our
understanding of gender. According to Bolin the identities expressed by cross-dressers
“destablize” our gender categories, potentially opening a space for the development of
subjectivity free from the constraints of what she calls the “western gender paradigm.”
This paradigm manifests an ideology that explains social roles in terms of biological
sex. Within this ideology the behavior associated with masculinity and femininity is
understood as being perfectly natural because it follows from our body’s physical
characteristics. Those who possess a female anatomy express the feminine gender role
because gendered behavior is assumed to be linked to anatomy. This results in the
assumption that one’s gender follows from his or her sex. Our identity categories
reflect this cultural truth with femininity and masculinity being recognized as the
expression of our body’s biological make-up.
Integral to this paradigm is a binary conception of gender. We assume there are
only two genders following from two biological sexes. Bolin articulates the practices
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of the transgender community (the self-describing phrase used by cross-dressers and
others who express gender variation) as subverting this ideology, as breaking down the
associative links upon which the paradigm is based. The practice of cross-dressing
“unsettles” the ideological link between gender and sex by juxtaposing the signifiers of
one gender with the anatomical features of the other sex. The effect is the graphic
depiction of the mutual independence of these two characteristics of identity. When
gender is freed from sex the identity categories (such as male and female) are unsettled.
The categories are shown to rest upon culturally constructed presumptions rather than
essential characteristics of the physical body. According to Bolin this subversion calls
for the recognition of a third and possibily more gender categories since the identity
being expressed by the transgender(ist) does not correspond to his or her sex. Breaking
the link between identity and the physical characteristics of the body forces the re
definition of our gender categories and the recognition that gender is a construct
independent of sex. This allows gender to be based on properties other than those
associated with the biological body, opening the possibility of articulating the existence
of a third gender category corresponding to the identities expressed by the transgender
community. Describing these identities as a third gender “opens a new cultural space”
in which a transgendered identity can develop, freeing the subject from the constraints
of a binary gender paradigm. This removes the transgender(ist) from the margins of
society, providing liberation for those whose identity cannot be reduced to the binary
term of the gender paradigm.
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In Bolin’s account she does not see the practices of the transgender community
challenging gender as a defining characteristic of being. The transgender community is
described as requiring a reconsideration of what constitutes gender by calling into
question the contents and form of our gender categories. Transgendered identities
leave gender as a signified object intact while challenging our paradigmatic
understanding of gender as binary. It is my hypothesis that this conclusion is
problematic. I plan to show that cross-dressing has nothing to do with liberation, and
that a subversion of ideology does not take place in the practices of the transgender
community. Rather, as articulated by Bolin the practices of the transgender community
reify the western binary gender paradigm. Consequently, Bolin’s reading of the
transgender community must be understood as portraying the cross-dressed subject as a
prisoner trapped within the social categories she/he seeks to transcend. I claim the
practices of the transgender community need to be read in a different light. In doing so
an understanding of cross-dressing can be developed that approaches the practice from
outside the political framework established by Bolin. Approaching the practice of
cross-dressing from outside the identity politics of Bolin reconfigures our
understanding of the subject who cross-dresses. It is my goal to develop an
understanding of the transgender community’s practices that does not portray their
expressions of subjectivity as being motivated by a political agenda, nor as a
reification, but as a practice organized by an economy of enjoyment.
In order to understand how Bolin’s study misses it mark, producing a portrait of
the subject as trapped, as opposed to liberated, we need to look at the relationship
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posited between the signifiers of gender and ideology. This project returns to the place
of the commodity in the construction of identity because the signifiers of gender, in this
case, are commodities. Reading Bolin’s work in conjunction with Hebdige’s provides
a contrasting view of the commodity’s role in the construction of identity since her
understanding of subculture is exactly opposite to that of Hebdige’s. For Bolin the
social actor can subvert the dominant social structure by rearranging the signifiers of
his or her identity. In Hebdige’s terms this amounts to the transgender community
making the signifier ‘signify and signify again as something di£ferent’(Hebdigel979:3):
a third gender. This indicates a radically different understanding of identity since it
posits the agency of the subject as providing the means to subvert the dominant social
order. Bolin sees the subject as defining their own identity through the establishment
of the meaning of the signifiers used to express their identity.
For Bolin, the subject of subculture does exactly what Hebdige said it couldn’t.
The gestures of cross-dressers do signal “a refusal and resistance to society’s
dominant”; with their actions not just “ending in style”(Hebdigel979:3), as Hebdige
would have us believe. As articulated by Bolin the practices of the transgender
community amount to much more than “the expression of the darker side of sets of
regulations”(Hebdige1979:3). For Bolin their stylistic arrangements actually provide
an alternative to current social relationships by graphically depicting a different set of
principles upon which social organization can be based. Whereas for Hebdige these
arrangements amount to nothing but “just so much graffiti on a prison
wall”.(Hebdigel979:3) To follow this metaphor, Bolin describes the transgender
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community as having jumped the prison walls by “magically appropriating” the
“humble objects” of the dominant. Putting these objects to their own use, the
transgender community transforms the meaning of these objects as well as their identity
into structures that are marching as well as dancing in the street. And the “humble
objects” of the dominant, such as articles of clothing or images o f the ideal somatic
form, in which Hebdige found nothing more than the signifiers of continued
domination are providing the tools for resistance. In order to understand how Bolin
was able to draw these conclusions we need to examine the structure of her argument.
By carefully recounting Bolin’s steps we can explore the assumptions and conceptions
that provide the back-bone of her argument, exposing the moment in which Bolin’s
understanding of the subject is infused with something more that enables it to almost
magically transcend social domination. This will lead back to the place of the
commodity form in the construction of identity, since in Bolin’s argument, the
commodity provides the key to the transgender community’s ability to subvert the
dominant gender paradigm.
The first step in Bolin’s argument calls for expanding our identity categories to
include the possibility of “supernumerary” genders. According to Bolin we need to
include the possibility of more than two genders if we are to theorize intersubjective
relationships outside the “Euro-American” gender paradigm. This argument is based
on the subversive potential of constructing identities that confirm the independence of
sex from gender. Such an identity is illustrated by Karen, one of Bolin’s informants,
who states:
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To use the more common terminology, I would say I am transgendered. I cross-dress but
not for sexual display or attraction. There is a feeling that is feminine, pretty and
desirable. Yet, I don’t change as a ‘person’. My gestures and walk are compatible with a
feminine appearance, but not exaggerated, my voice unchanged. I don’t consider myself a
different person, just another visage or aspect o f the same person... At times I prefer
feminine gestures and expressions, but more often masculine responses. When societal
binarism insists I choose one pole or the other, I choose masculine. I have been raised as a
male, my sexual anatomy is male, etc. Nonetheless, I insist that I am ‘ambigenderal.’ I
claim all gender space, if you will, and exist within this spectrum at different points at
different times.(Bolinl994:465)

Karen’s identity signals subversion because it challenges the ideology that necessitates
a link between sex and gender. She has re-arranged the signifiers of sex and gender to
construct an identity that, strictly speaking, is neither male nor female. Karen has the
anatomy of a biological male but elects a social persona based on context. Her chosen
persona does not necessarily follow her anatomical sex yet at times it does, expressing
a fluidity to gender. Karen expresses her chosen persona by assembling the signifiers
of the feminine gender and arranging them in such a way that she becomes socially
female. She is able to re-define and hence change her social identity by assembling and
arranging such signifiers of gender as articles of clothing, gestures, hairstyles, and
expressions into a form that emulates femininity.
In the process of assembling the signifiers of femininity and juxtaposing them
with the signifiers of the opposite sex both sets of signifiers gain new meanings,
challenging the assumption that the signifiers of gender, such as hairstyle, behavior, or
clothing, correspond with sexual identity. The objects signifying gender are shown to
represent something different when known to be arranged by choice. Gender becomes
performative with the collection of signifiers that operate as props reflecting the
demands of social convention as opposed to an essential quality of the body. The actor
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consciously manipulates the signifiers of gender to re-assign their meanings. By re
assigning the meaning of the signifier the signified object, gender is re-defined as well.
In this case one’s gender is shown to exist along a continuum, as a matter of degree
along a fluid scale as opposed to the concrete terms of the western gender paradigm.
Re-arranging the signifiers of gender in such a way that their meaning is re
assigned expresses identities that cannot be assimilated into the existing categories of
our gender paradigm, producing ambiguous identities. We speak of such identities as
ambiguous because what is being expressed is neither male nor female, it is something
else, something is not recognized in our gender categories. The collection of signifiers
assembled by Karen are unintelligible, they deny our ideological understanding that
gender is binary. Rather, they express a continuum that allows Karen to claim all
gender space. Karen’s “choice” in social role unsettles the dominant gender paradigm,
forcing a reconceptualization of our gender categories. For Bolin Karen’s choice in
gender role is subversive because it demonstrates the independence of gender from sex,
calling into question the capabilities of a binary paradigm to explain social identity and
role in terms of biological sex.
For Bolin this “unsettling” of the gender paradigm is the first step towards the
development of new identity categories that do not depend on an alignment between
sex and gender. The construction of new identities is possible at this point in time
because as Karen illustrates the paradigmatic understanding of gender as being linked
to sex has been broken. Since this link is broken it is now possible to conceptualize a
third gender category that removes the constraints on subjectivity imposed by an
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ideology that grounds gender in sex. This allows for theorizing intersubjective social
relationships absent of the limitations exacted by a binary conception of gender. The
recognition of a third possibility leads to liberation for those who “fall between the
cracks” of the western binary gender paradigm by providing an identity category
corresponding to their experience as subjects. Having a social category to describe
such an identity enables the development of alternative subjectivities to those currently
recognized by our binary gender system. Recognition signals liberation since those
whose presence was previously denied are given the opportunity to develop free from
the constraints of an ideology that continually erases their presence. Bolin sees the
transgender community as being engaged in the process of defining themselves as a
viable alternative to our identity categories based on sex. Bolin refers to this as a
project of “cultur-ing”; claiming it exemplifies the creating of “new forms, and seeing
new relationships in social forms as identities.”(Bolinl994:477) The result is the
emergence and development of new identities where formerly there were none.
The analogy of the closet, in which prior to “coming out” an identity is present
but denied, is a fitting description of Bolin’s understanding of the emergence of
transgendered identity. For Bolin, before the break-down of the gender paradigm,
transgendered identities existed but could not be described as legitimate expressions o f
subjectivity. Prior to the described “cultur-ing” project those who are now considered
transgendered either hid their subjectivity in the closet or were considered to be
afflicted with a pathological disorder. This is made clear by Bolin who states:
Ten years ago male-to-female transsexualism supported the binary gender schema by
dividing gender-dysphorie individuals into men and women where transvestites were
considered sick or pathological men and transsexuals were women on whom nature had
erred. In contrast, the recently emerging transgendered identity offers an account of
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gender as a social product by giving one the option o f living as a woman or a blend
without surgical reassignment. The possible permutations within transgenderism are
innumerable and lay bare the point that gender is not biology but is socially
produced.(Bolinl994:482)

This example shows how subject positions, such as those of the transgender
community, can be present but denied visibility by an ideological system. Once the
influence of ideology is removed what was once regarded as a gender “disorder” is
reconfigured as the expression of a legitimate identity. Describing the subjectivity of
the transgender community as the expression of a third gender category transforms
what was once actively erased, or austracized from society into a valid identity.
The second step in Bolin’s argument exposes the mechanics of the ideology that
links sex to gender. She historicizes its development, making it clear that such
categories as masculine or feminine are not universal. We see this effort in Bolin’s
claim that the idea of “two genders founded on two biological sexes” only began to
predominate during the eighteenth centuiy. The emphasis Bolin places on the
historicity of gender and its accompanying categories is further illuminated by her
statement that reads: “Perhaps the task of the twenty-first-century scholar will be to
deconstruct the social history of a tri-gender paradigm whose awakenings began in the
1990s.”(Bolinl994:485) The effect of histroricizing our understanding of gender as a
binary system is to show that such categories as male or female are neither universal
nor timeless. Rather, these categories are descriptive terms for a historically and
culturally specific social organizations. Incorporating this knowledge into our
understanding of identity brings the inherent instability of gender as a paradigm, no
matter how many categories are recognized, to the forefront of our awareness.
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Although she does not go so far as to say gender should be done away with altogether
as a concept for understanding social organization, Bolin does continually trouble
gender and its accompanying categories as they exist within the Euro-American binary
paradigm. The effect is to destabilize the categories while retaining gender as an object
around which subjectivity is organized universally. This is illustrated by her
expectation that her “tri-gender” paradigm will be deconstructed in the future. For
Bolin gender categories can always be taken apart to expose and undo the ideological
matrix informing the category’s meaning yet are needed to understand social
organization cross-culturally. Bolin refers to the process as a “deconstruction”1since
the transgendered identity illuminates the necessary conditions demanded by ideology
for the construction of a meaningful gender identity. We can speak of ideology as
necessitating a link between sex and gender because, as was illustrated above by Karen,
when sex and gender are not aligned we are faced with a conundrum. When the
conditions necessitated by ideology for inclusion within a social category such as
gender are not met, we do not know what to call that person.
The mandated link between sex and gender is seen in conceptions of
reproduction. Common-sensically the reproduction of society is dependent on the
reproduction of individuals, and the reproduction of individuals involves the sexual

1 It is important to note that I am using the term “deconstruction” as it is employed by Bolin, and not in the
strict definition o f the term as it has been established by Derrida. The importance o f making this distinction
is to avoid a lengthy discussion o f Bolin’s use o f the term. It is my belief that if one were to return to
Derrida’s texts, the context in which Bolin employs this term could be exposed as erroneous. The “logos”
and the dependence o f western metaphysics upon it, the exposure o f which is the job o f deconstruction, is
not congruent with the term ideology as it is used in Bolin’s text. An exploration o f the implications o f
conflating the dependency of western metaphysics on logocentrism and the importance o f ideology in
defining common conceptions of gender could be another paper.
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coupling of a man and a woman. Yet, to be a “man” or to be a “woman” is more than
a matter of anatomy. To be a man, or to be a woman, involves behavior: one needs to
be masculine or feminine as well as possess the proper anatomical features. An
essential component of being masculine or feminine involves the erotic attraction to the
opposite sex. Without this heterosexual attraction one is not recognized as truly being
a man or a woman. This establishes the reproduction of heterosexuality as an integral
part of our understanding of physical reproduction. Our understanding of physical
reproduction not only reproduces the species but the behaviors associated with
heterosexuality. The individuals we reproduce socially follow the formulaic
association between heterosexuality and reproduction, with gender roles stemming
from heterosexual reproduction. This conflation indicates the presence of ideology
because we consider it perfectly natural that individuals are sexually attracted to the
opposite sex, and when they are not there is confusion. The mandatory link between
heterosexuality and gender in the categories male and female is described by Bolin as
follows:
In the western paradigm, gender operates as ‘the central organizing principle’ o f sexuality
and sexual orientation exists only in relationship to gender and physiology. ‘Males’ are
expected to be men: tough, strong behavior is not enough unless they are also attracted to
women as sexual partners. Thus heterosexuality is a major component o f ‘normal’ gender
expression. (Bolinl 994:485)

To illustrate how the transgender community “deconstructs” the dominant gender
paradigm Bolin draws from individuals whose identities push the gender paradigm
beyond its limits. Examples include a the male-to-female transvestite who claims a
lesbian sexual orientation, and a female-to-male transsexual who considers herself
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lesbian. The ambiguity of such an identity stems from their failure to follow the
formulaic association expected by ideology. These individuals remain unassimilable in
the gender paradigm, providing an example of how ideology mandates a connection
between specific signified attributes for the production of a legitimate identity.
We can see this “deconstruction” in action by examining the case of Jane, a latethirtyish transgender(ist). Jane’s identity “deconstructs” our gender categories because
in Jane’s identity we can see the conditions ideology demands for inclusion in a gender
category.
Jane lives as a woman with “her” wife Mary. They were married when Jane was John, and
over the course o f time John has become femininzed with hormones, electrolysis and
hairstyle. Although this has caused problems in the marriage, Mary has continued to try
and accept these changes. John is still able to engage in intercourse, as the hormones have
not yet interfered with the capacity for erection, although this will eventually happen. This
case illustrates how Western gender terminology, which is so reliant on biological insignia,
becomes incoherent when the genitalism o f the gender paradigm is revoked...Mary regards
herself as heterosexual in orientation, although she defines sexual intimacy with her spouse
Jane as somewhere between lesbian and heterosexual.(Bolinl994:484)

Jane “deconstructs” the western gender paradigm by pointing out the ideologically
necessary link between the biological body, sexual practice, and behavior for the
production of a meaningful identity. In deffering from the standard relationship
between these three terms she illuminates the dependence of our gender categories on
their connection.
For Bolin, Jane illustrates the process through which ideology brings an object
into view. Ideology provides a descriptive category corresponding to that object,
instituting the cultural significance of that object as it is described. Bolin’s conception
of ideology can be likened to a lens that focuses ones eye, establishing that which is
relevant by providing a signifier to describe that object. The lens brings gender into
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view, establishing, among other tilings, the behaviors associated with heterosexual
eroticism as one of its signiflers. These signifiers are then placed in a descriptive
framework in which the relationship between the object and its signifiers becomes
seamless. In this case ideology infuses such signifiers as the genitalia, body shape,
dress, and hairstyle with significance by linking them to the object gender in
descriptive categories representative of that object. The lens of ideology illuminates
the essence of the object as being aligned with the essence of the social category
describing the object. The signifiers assembled by the transgender(ist), such as
homosexual eroticism, the development of breasts on a male body, or the stylistic
display of androgyny express ambiguity since these signifiers do not correlate with the
social categories representing the object, gender. Since there is no categoiy to
correspond with these signifiers, the subjectivity of those who express themselves with
these signifiers is relegated to the nether regions of scientific speculation and obscurity.
The effect of ideology is seen in the classification given to gender variants in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (or DSM-lUR for short) - the
diagnostic hand-book for mental illness used by the medical community. Tracy, a self
identified transvestite, describes how ideology operates to relegate those whose identity
does not correspond with the established social categories to the margins of society.
Tracy’s words also provide a graphic description of the changes in our understanding of
gender brought abo ut by the gradual erosion of the ideology that links the specific
social categories with the body.
There[in the DSM-HIR] we are listed as transvestic fetishists, right there with the sadomasochists,..child molesters and...aggressive butt-rubbers. We are summarily dismissed as
deviants rather than variants in Western society. The alternative is to be transsexual or
gender dysphoric - i.e., gender identity disorder o f adolescence and adulthood, non-
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transsexual type. Now is that a mouthfiil? An obvious exaggerated attempt to force
people into a category. George Orwell would be delighted.(in Bolinl 994:473)

Tracy’s description of our changing understanding of gender also exemplifies the
definition of ideology being put forward by Bolin. As can be seen, ideology for Bolin
is not invisible or unconscious, as it is for Hebdige. Ideology is profoundly visible and
profoundly conscious. We can see this in the fact that Tracy is aware o f “Western
thoughts exaggerated attempt to force people into a category”. Ideology is not infusing
the space between the signifier and the object. The meaning of the signifier is found in
the category describing the object, and not by its position in relation to other signifiers.
To use Barthes’ terms, Bolin does not find a second order semiological system infusing
the signifier with meaning. For Bolin the signifiers of gender always signify gender,
but in the case of the transgender community the gender that is signified does not
correspond with the categories “male” and “female” as they are socially constructed in
western society. The category describing the object is where ideology works its magic,
creating a seamless web of significance between the categories of a socially
constructed reality and the material world. Bolin’s conception of the relationship
between the signifier and ideology is important to my reading of her work since it
determines the image of the subject as it is represented in her text.
The position Bolin would like to press home is that identity categories, such as
sex and gender, are historical constructs describing the symbolic expression of a
specific social organization. These categories seem eternal because ideology operates
to naturalize the social relationships they describe through the universalist terms of
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biology. It is important to question Bolin’s conception of ideology by asking what the
signifiers of our identity categories are. This question brings Bolin’s conception of the
subject to the forefront, since there is something about the signifier and the process of
assembling signifiers to express identity that allows Bolin to read the practices of the
transgender community as liberatory. The investigation of this relationship moves the
discussion away from a description of Bolin’s work and towards a critical reading of
her text because she finds something more in the signifiers of gender than the
expression of identity. This “something more” is the focus of my inquiry and serves as
a point of departure for an alternate reading of the transgender community’s practices a reading that views gender not as an object but as a sign.
The “something more” Bolin finds in the signifiers of gender is the logic of the
commodity form. Bolin finds the signifiers of gender to possess a use-value that
provides the means to unravel ideology. We can see the logic of the commodity form
entering into Bolin’s understanding of the signifiers of gender in her description of the
position anthropological and historical knowledge of gender occupy in the transgender
community. It is Bolin’s understanding that the transgender community relies on
anthropology’s conception of cultural relativism and historical reconstructions of the
past to legitimize their own experience as subjects in contemporary American society.
The quintessential example of this is seen in the explanation of the role played by the
Berdache in the transgender community. According to Bolin the Berdache tradition is
used as a model for the development of a transgendered identity. As Bolin states, the
Berdache tradition is used by the transgender and gay community as a source of identity
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as well as pride, providing a cultural instance of a legitimate third gender that is
recognized both historically and culturally. In this third category the transgender
community supposedly sees biological males living as social females, complete with
recognized status and rank. As described by Bolin, for the transgender community the
identity of the Berdache represents a historical and cultural example in which our
society’s gender paradigm is shown to be lacking in descriptive capabilities for those
individuals who are neither male nor female, but something else. Those who are
something else are given a societal space within the Berdache category, which can be
understood as a cultural instance of a third gender. In this example we see Bolin
viewing anthropological knowledge as providing the raw material to be used for the
construction of a legitimate third gender categoiy.
This is indicative of “something more” entering into Bolin’s understanding of
cross-dressing because no longer are the transgender community’s actions understood
as representative of social processes. Once the transgender community is understood as
using anthropological knowledge for the construction of identity, they become actors
making informed choices for the attainment of a specific end. The transgender(ist) is
no longer manipulating the contents of our gender categories, they are consuming
signifiers for the attainment of a use-value. In this case the use-value of
anthropological knowledge is its ability to aid in die dismantling of the western binary
gender paradigm by providing the means to see through ideology.
The complexity of this logic is depicted by Bolin’s statement that reads:
It is not surprising that the cross-cultural record and anthropology’s relativism have been
included in the social construction o f gender variant identities by the organizational
gatekeepers of the gender community.... Anthropological as well as historical data are
reinterpreted as part of the roots and developing empowerment o f the transgendered

49

community. Interestingly what seems to be happening is an integration and valuing o f the
anthropological concept o f relativism, that is, the recognition that culture is an important
component in the construction o f gender ideologies, identities and statuses.... By using
the Berdache as a model, the transgender community and homosexual community become
active participants in reshaping their culture and in finding affiliation where division
existed(Bolin1994:475)

What is important to recognize is the relationship posited by Bolin between the
signifier, the subject, and ideology. In the above passage we can glean how Bolin’s
particular conception of the signifier and of its capacity to signify identity defines a
particular conception of the subject. The subject is agential, capable of seeing culture
as a determinant in the formation of ideology, and to strategize accordingly in the
construction of new identity categories. The subject is not blinded by ideology to the
true implications of their use of commodified signifiers as Hebdiged understands the
punks to be. The subject is a consumer of the lexicon of signifiers representing gender
in his or her cultural surroundings. The act of consumption is guided by the usefulness
of specific signifiers for the construction of a new identity. The legitimacy of this
construction comes from the further consumption of the promised use-values of
anthropological and historical knowledge. The consumption of anthropology and
history provides historical and cultural instances that can serve as precedence for the
inclusion of non-binary sexual identity in society’s categories. Legitimacy does not
come from the trace of a real or historically “true” set of social relations contained in
the signifiers of identity. It comes from having an outside authority such as an
anthropologist or historian recognize your actions as operateing in excess of the
western gender paradigm. The anthropologist’s authority comes from his or her role as
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producers of knowledge, making them expert on the knowledge consumed since they
produced it.
By positing knowledge of genders history as useful Bolin automatically enters
into the logic of the commodity form. This logic depicts the subject as an agential
consumer of relativism for the purpose of seeing through the dominant gender
paradigm. The use-value of relativism is the capacity to dismantle the ideology of the
western binary gender paradigm by providing a perspective that lets it be seen as one
arrangement among many. The particular ideology of the western gender paradigm can
then be dismantled through the further consumption of gender signifiers. Once this
logic is in place the signifiers of gender, such as dress, hairstyle, or behavior, can be
exploited for their use-value to dismantle gender as a binary system. This logic
explains the role given to the commodity form itself, as a material object acting as a
signifier, in the emergence of transgendered identities by Bolin.
In order to understand the role of the commodity form in the emergence of
transgendered identities we need to return to Bolin’s description of how the transgender
community has been able to emerge at this point in time as a legitimate identity. And
according to Bolin this has been the direct result of changes in our conceptions of
femininity in the late twentieth century. As she states: “Conventional femininity in the
late twentieth century is in a process of re-definition socially, economically and
especially important, somatically.”(Bolinl994:478). This leads to an overall
redefinition of the ideal feminine form. Bolin posits changes in the ideal feminine
body form as stemming from “a world wide movement towards health and fitness”
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which has replaced the “very thin silhouette ideal of the 1960s” with the empowered
physique of the female athlete. This “revised feminine body ideal” establishes “toned
muscles and taut physiques”(Bolinl994:478) as a definitional characteristic of
femininity, resulting in the undermining of the assumption that a particular body form
equates with a particular gender. Today muscularity is no longer viewed as a trait
reserved for men. “Women body builders, long-distance runners, and mountain
climbers, create new embodiments of femininity that defy the traditional soma of
woman as soft and curvaceous.”(Bolinl994:478) The development of these new forms
breaks the bio-centric ideology that necessitates a link between particular body shapes
and gender. With this break comes the possibility of “a social woman with a
penis”(Bolin: 1994:479) since the mandate that gender follow sex has been gradually
eroded away by changing conceptions of the ideal feminine body form.
As Bolin sees it the commodity form is responsible for these changes in the image
of the body forms associated with our gender categories. Literally, changes in the look
of masculinity and femininity can be traced to its representation in the mass media
since advertisements and fashion magazines reflect the ideal shape of a masculine or
feminine body as it is configured socially. This “ideal shape” becomes the
embodiment of gender since, by association, to be masculine or feminine is to possess
the body representative of these categories. For Bolin changes in the image of the ideal
body shape of masculinity or femininity are crucial to the emergence of transgendered
identity since these changes can either facilitate or establishes a formidable barrier to
those who wish to live socially as the opposite gender. And in the late twentieth-
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centuiy changes in the image of the ideal feminine body form have facilitated those
who wish to live socially as female but possess the anatomy of a male. This is made
clear by Kathy, “a petit middle-aged cross-dresser”, who states:
The women I have always found attractive and try to emulate are assertive, self-sufficient,
and emotionally and physically strong. This body type and personality type have become
increasingly accepted. The image I portray is essentially that o f an alert, athletic, highly
trained female body builder. Acceptance by society of this type o f woman has benefited me
greatly. Ten years ago, there were no female body types such as mine thought to be
attractive. Cory Everson, Florence Griffith Joyner, and others have broken new ground.(in
Bolinl 994:479)

As Kathy’s statement indicates, recent changes in the ideal form of the feminine
body have facilitated the development of transgendered identities by providing a form
biological males can easily emulate. Biological males can now more easily “pass” as
social females because the ideal body type of femininity has become more man-like.
For Bolin the recent emergence of the transgender community can be directly attributed
to these changes affecting the ideal feminine soma as it is represented in commodity
forms. Quite literally, in the late twentieth century, changes in the definition of the
ideal form of femininity have enabled biological men to more easily occupy that form.
Ease of emulation has resulted in an increased number of men choosing to live socially
as women without altering their bodies surgically or hormonally. The increased
occupation of the feminine form by biological males has produced a situation where
our conventional gender categories are challenged by identities that do not conform to
the socially established parameters. The result is the break down of the western gender
paradigm since a biological male who lives socially as a female expresses an identity
that confirms the independence of sex from gender.
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Bolin sees the subversive potential of this act lying in its ability to subvert the
social order by deactivating gender as a principle for social organization. Jason
Cromwell makes this clear when he states: “To acknowledge the validity of ‘men with
vaginas’ and (‘women with penises’) would be to admit that men as well as women
could resist and thus, subvert the social order, by approximating the ‘other’ but never
fully becoming the ‘other’.”(Cromwell in Bolinl994:485) The importance of changing
conceptions of the ideal feminine or masculine body shape for the emergence of “men
with vaginas” is made clear by Bolin who states:
The androgynous-appearing soma o f some women athletes combines symbols o f
masculinity and femininity on a physical level... .It may be assumed that the relaxing of
bodily gender rules and the undermining o f the biological paradigm since the 1960s
[because of the increased popularity o f such activities as body-building, mountain
climbing, and long distance running among women] has undoubtedly contributed to the
trend toward a transgendered community and the creation o f nonsurgical transsexuals.
Such transformations of the female body erode constructs o f behaviors and bodies as
natural by creating the possibility for a social woman with a penis. (Bolinl 994:479)

In this example the commodity form is acting as a catalyst, providing the means
for the transgendered individual to emerge from the margins of society. In the
commodity form Bolin finds the signifiers defining the look of gender as well as the
objects providing the means for attaining that look and inclusion in the category. We
see this in the emulation of the ideal body form of femininity by men who wish to live
socially as women as well as in the assemblage of commodities whose use as
accessories completes the transformation from being male to socially female. Once
these signifiers are assembled the binary gender paradigm automatically unravels from
within.
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The problem with finding revolutionary potential in “the new images of the ideal
feminine body form” disseminated in the mass media is that these images are infused
with ideological significance. These images are part of what Theodore Adorno has
labeled “the culture industry” and have been shown to define the experience of
occupying such categories as male and female.(see Adorno: 1991) Adorno has shown
that these images not only work to define who is included in such social categories but
to define the meaning of being included in such categories as well. Bolin is prevented
from seeing this because she is blind to the logic of the commodity form. She doesn’t
see the social relationships expressed by the commodity as being indicative of a
separate logic. The commodity does not have a fetishistic nature for Bolin. Its
meaning is established in a democratic process and does not express a larger set of
social relationships than those expressed in the contents of its form. Is it possible that
an anatomical male embodying the ideal form of femininity does not represent the
unraveling of the gender paradigm but the opposite, its reification? In order to
understand how this might be we need to turn to the work of Susan Willis, who outlines
the problem of dissociating the evolution of body forms and their accompanying
images from ideological systems that define the meaning of the such categories as
“masculinity” and “femininity”. Upon reading Willis, it becomes apparent that Bolin’s
“deconstruction” of gender fails due to a misrecognition of the relationship between the
commodity and ideology. As a result, Bolin fails to recognize the body as a site of
reification and the possibility that body forms can become commodified. This
misrecognition results in her failure to realize that the practices of the transgender
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community actually perpetuates the very ideological structures from which Bolin
claims they are liberated.
Bolin’s failure can be attributed to her seduction by the logic of the commodity
form, becoming fascinated by the form’s content, ignoring the logic that gives form to
this content. Remaining immersed in the logic of the form’s content prevents her from
seeing the images she envisions as providing the means for the emergence and
development of transgendered identities as images produced to enhance consumption
and to normalize a particular social organization that continually defines gender as an
attribute of the physical body. This failure can be seen in Bolin’s statement that reads:
The growing transgender community has also been influenced by changes and challenges
to embodiments o f femininity. Conventional femininity in the late twentieth century is in a
process of redefinition socially, economically and, especially important to this essay,
somatically....A world-wide movement toward health and fitness has resulted in a revised
feminine body ideal that includes toned muscles and taut physiques. Women body
builders’ stout muscles, previously relegated as a trait reserved for men, have begun to
undermine bio-centric ideologies and equations o f muscularity and
manliness.(Bolinl994:478)

By positing these changes in the shape of the ideal feminine soma as the result of social
revisions in the definition of femininity Bolin is saying the evolution of the ideal
feminine body form is a democratic process and not mediated or influenced by power.
In ‘Work(ing) Out’, from A Primer for Daily Life, Susan Willis develops an
argument explaining the evolution of female body forms in terms of expanding
capitalist markets. Willis describes the specific development of health clubs and the
“fitness craze” as an advanced form of commodification in which the body, its parts,
and its shape are transformed into commodities to be sold back to the person as an
idealized package. This package is marketed as reflecting the look of a “contemporary
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woman” and while expressing an empowered image of women, actually works to
continue the domination of women by men. Part of this continued domination involves
determining the qualities and characteristics of femininity. For Willis the
quintessential example of this is the development of the Nautilus machine and the
Nautilus work out. The importance of die Nautilus machine lies in its design.
According to Willis the machine isolates the individual person as well as specific
muscle groups. As it isolates the individual, the machine “tones to perfection” the
specific muscle groups whose enhancement is recognized as indicating an ideal form of
gender. Quite literally the Nautilus workout is designed to produce a specific body
shape and form while simultaneously producing a particular relationship between the
self and machine:
When asked to describe the nautilus, most people express similar feelings o f being
assimilated into the machine. Rather than the direct expenditure of effort out o f your
body, along a wire over a pulley to lift a weight, the nautilus incorporates your body into
its function. The woman inside the nautilus machine is the object produced by the
machine even while she is at the same time the producer producing herself as product of
the machine.(Willisl991:75)

What is important to take from Willis’s statement is the combined production of
the body as a commodified entity and the relationship of the self to that entity as it is
mediated by the Nautilus machine. As Willis points out it is a particular form of the
body that is being sold, and it is a particular relationship between the self and that body
that is being fostered by the “fitness craze”. This relationship translates the want for a
physically fit body into the objectification of the individual by the machine producing
that body. In the Nautilus work-out not only is a specific body form being produced by
the Nautilus machine, but a particular relationship between the consumer and the
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producer is being cultivated as well. The subject is objectified not only by the machine
but by the ideology of the producer working to establish the body shape produced by
their machine as the ideal shape of femininity. The relationship between working out,
producing the ideal body, and ideology becomes particularly insidious when given the
association between being fit and being in tune with the body’s “natural” order. The
product the consumer wishes to consume is the image of the body disseminated by the
machine’s producer, an image manufactured to sell athletic equipment. In producing
that body form the individual is transformed into an object of the machine, an object
whose contours are mediated not only by the machine itself, but by the same
ideological apparatus that defines the specific characteristics of gender as the
possession of a particular body form.
So when Willis states: “The workout focuses women’s positive desires for
strength, agility, and the physical affirmation of self and transforms these into
competition over style and rivalry for a particular body look and
performance”(Willisl991:70), it becomes apparent that the image of the “ideal” shape
of femininity is more complicated than Bolin originally thought. The form of gender
reflected in the “ideal” shape of the body is part and parcel of the same social process
that marks specific individuals as gendered then defines a particular look to coincide
with that gender. This look is grounded in the body by establishing the ultimate
example of gender as the possession of a particular body shape. This connection
between body shape and gender serves to reinforce the associative link between gender
and biological sex by giving currency to the idea that the ultimate signifier of gender is
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the body. The idea that gender and its accompanying categories might be nothing more
than descriptive terms for specific arrangements of signifiers is undermined. The look
of gender is shown to be the look of the body, enforcing the associative link between
the biological body and identity.
What is important to recognize in Willis’s argument is her effort to problematize
the form of gender while retaining the liberatory aspects of that form’s contents. A
crucial element of Willis’s argument is the potential “working out” offers for women as
a liberatory mechanism. Willis refers to this as the “implicit utopian dimension”
inherent to all mass cultural forms, and is referring to the unintended subversive
potential of women working out together. The unintended outcome of the
commodification of women’s bodies is the development of women’s communities
outside and separate from the household. Going to the gym and working out with a
collectivly with other women allows the opportunity for camaraderie and consciousness
raising while engaging in the production of physically powerful bodies. But again the
point has to be driven home that this is only a potential held within the form. And the
realization of this potential is continually denied by the mediating influence of
consumer capitalism and its accompanying ideology. We can see this paradoxical
situation in Willis’s description of community based exercise programs.
Community sponsored exercise programs do not sever their participants from their lives
with families and friends. Rather the exercise class creates an opportunity for women to
develop themselves in community with other women. Such opportunities are absolutely
negated when exercise is channeled by the media into private living-rooms. The private
spa, then, offers escape from job or domestic space, but it severely limits the opportunities
for conversation and community. This is because a woman who participates in aerobics at
a spa is made to see herself as an isolated individual. The atmosphere of the spa promotes
an aura o f body rivalry. Mirrors are everywhere. Women compare but do not share
themselves with others. They see themselves as bodies, they scrutinize their lines and
curves and they check out who is wearing the hottest leotard.(Willisl991:70)
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Can we say that Bolin has misconstrued the utopian dimensions of commodification,
recognizing the positive potential of new images of the ideal feminine body but is
denying the mediating influence of ideology?
After reading Willis it becomes apparent that Bolin has confused content with
form. The form of gender is not troubled by men emulating the ideal feminine body.
Instead, the ideal, as an object to be emulated for the expression of femininity, is
reified. The body is made into an object whose form acts as a signifier for the
expression of femininity. The bodily form of gender, even when occupied by a
biological male, is not troubled, but objectified. The social processes that establish a
particular body shape as a definitional characteristic of femininity are not troubled by
biological men occupying the form. Rather, when a man occupies that form, the form,
as an indicator of femininity, is depicted as the norm. If a man who wants to live as a
social women attains this by emulating the ideal shape of femininity then that shape is
given currency as an essence of femininity. Femininity becomes associated with a
particular body shape and possession of that body shape an example of the hyper
feminine.
We can see how this occurs in the words of one of Bolin’s informants who made
the following statement in reference to the expected behavioral and sartorial etiquette
to be upheld at a cross-dresser’s convention.
We are going to enforce our dress and behavior policies ...Evidently there are a few
uninformed who think hotels allow real women dressed as hookers to troll the
lobby....please (for all our sakes) use the same taste in attire you would want your sister,
mother, or your dad, (if he’s one of us) to use. People in [— ] have very definite ideas
about what a lady should look like. ..help us convince them we are no different from the
average woman in style o f dress.(unknown in Bolinl994:474)
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Bolin’s articulation of cross-dressing does not produce liberated subjects. Rather,
Bolin’s subjects are reproducing the already reified topological features of gender as
defined by the dominant ideology. A “deconstruction” has not taken place, and is not
the goal of the transgender community. Bolin has illustrated how the dominant form o f
femininity can include within its contents a social actor with a penis; or in the case o f
masculinity, social males with vaginas. The practices of the transgender community,
whether these be surgical and hormonal alterations of the body or sartorial displays,
leave the dominant gender paradigm intact. And the words of Pat, one of Bolin’s
informants illustrate this when s/he states:
I currently maintain a full-time androgynous persona, eliciting as many maam’s as I do sir
responses. My goal is to be free to present myself full female all the time, while still
expressing a healthy degree o f androgyny. Living as a woman gives me a much fuller
range o f expression than as a man. In time, I may feel more comfortable confronting the
world with the unabashed ambiguity o f total androgyny.(in Bolinl994:465)

The part of the above statement I wish to draw attention to is the perceived
necessity of confronting the world as either female or male, and the uncomfortable
feeling elicited by total androgyny. The discomfort of both those confronted by and
those confronting the world with androgyny illustrates how masculinity and femininity
remain “active” even in the transgender community’s practices. Might it not be true
that in a world in which gender is truly deactivated, the androgyn -- as the embodiment
of all genders - represents the liberated subject? After all, for the androgyny all gender
roles are situational and not the embodiment of an ideal that associates surface
signifiers with an essential quality hidden somewhere in the soma. The fact that the
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transgender(ists) are striving to “present” themselves as “full time female” (or full time
male) illustrates the remaining importance of gender for the expression of the self even
after it has been dissociated from biological sex. This remaining desire for a gendered
identity signals that “something more” is going on than the “deactivation” of gender a
in the transgender community’s practices. It is this “something more” that Bolin
cannot account for with her agential conception of the subject consciously consuming
the signifiers of gender in order to subvert the dominant gender paradigm. The next
chapter will develop an approach that can account for this “something more” infusing
the practice of cross-dressing for the transgender(ist). This will be done by delving into
the psycho-analytic world of Jaques Lacan.
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Chapter Four:
Something More

The work of Jaques Lacan provides a theoretical perspective that accounts for the
“something more” infusing the practices of the transgender community. The presence
of this “something more” missed by Bolin’s articulation of cross-dressing can be
accounted for and described by taking into account Lacan’s conception of the subject.
Approaching the transgender community from a Lacanian perspective necessitates an
alternative reading of the transgender community’s practices because for Lacan gender
is not an object that is signified but a sign acquiring meaning from desire. This
alternative reading moves away from analyzing cross-dressing in political terms and
approaches the practice as the expression of desire. This shift locates the importance o f
the act in its meaning for the subject and not in the implications of the act for the
dominant cultural constructions of gender. This allows the practices of the transgender
community to be viewed not as a “deconstruction” or a reification, but as the
expression of one’s subjectivity. If gender can be articulated as a sign, then the
importance of gender as a site for social analysis can be understood as an effect of
signification and not because it reflects an essential quality that organizes subjectivity.
This repositions gender as a process emerging with the subject, moving beyond the
presumption that gender exists as an ontological entity residing in us all.
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Fortunately, in her article Bolin provides a large number of actual statements
made by her informants. These statement provide the material to re-interpret the
practices of the transgender community as being indicative of “something more” than a
strategic move in the politics of identity. With this said let’s turn to the work of Lacan,
beginning with an explanation of his elusive statement that describes the end of the
psychoanalytic process as the moment the analysand “becomes their sinthome”1.
Explaining this process begins a discussion of Lacan’s understanding of the subject;
from here the discussion will expand to include the subject’s relationship to reality and
the implications of Lacan’s thought for Bolin’s analysis of gender.
In order to understand how the end of the psychoanalytic procedure is signaled by
the moment the patient “identifies with their sinthome,” the complex relationship
between the symptom, reality, and the subject must be explained since Lacan bestows a
radically ontological status on the symptom in his work. In order to describe the
Lacanian symptom I will be relying on the work of Slovoj Zizek, who, when ‘looking
awry’2 at the body of Lacan’s work, describes the symptom as a “fissure” or an
“asymmetry” designating a moment in which the subject has stumbled or fallen when

1 The term “sinthome” is used by Lacan to designate a “psychotic kernel that can neither be interpreted (as
symptom) nor “traversed” as fantasy.’’(Zizek 1991:137) What is important to recognize in his usage of this
term is that it is neither symptom nor fantasy, but a fundamental illogical foundation upon which all o f
existence is based. Zizek describes the formulation o f the term as “A neologism containing a set o f
associations (synthetic-artificial man, synthesis between symptom and fantasy, Saint Thomas, the
saint...)(Lacan 1988). Symptom as sinthome is a certain signifying formation penetrated with enjoyment: it is
a signifier as a bearer o f jouis-sense, enjoyment-in-sense ”(Zizekl989:75)
2 ‘Looking Awry’ is the title o f one o f Zizek’s books. He uses this phrase several times to describe how it is
sometimes easier to approach Lacanian theory from anywhere except head on. In this particular work of
Zizek approaches Lacanian theory through the films o f Alfred Hitchcock. I have taken Zizek’s phrase to
describe a similar process in which I will not be looking directly head-on at Lacan’s work; instead I will
bring Lacanian thought into light through other people’s explanations o f his work.
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confronted by the “Real”3. Metaphorically speaking this stumble causes a scratch or a
bruise in the subject’s psychic development. The pain of being psychically scratched is
so great that it cannot be remembered, resulting in an imperfection in the body of
knowledge pertaining to the subject’s self. The symptom develops over the scratch
both to cover over this lack in ones self-knowledge as well as to shield the subject from
re-experiencing the original traumatic event through its remembrance. As understood
by Lacan the subject covers over this trauma with a pleasurable thought, making the
symptom a sight of enjoyment. Lacan speaks of the symptom as a site of enjoyment
because the initial pain of the wound is replaced by a pleasurable sensation, making
desire a component of the symptom. We come to desire the symptom for the pleasure
it provides. In this way the subject desires to return to the originary site of the trauma
to derive the pleasurable sensation of the symptom. Due to the pleasurable sensation of
returning to the symptom the symptom persists, providing an organizing principle in
our existence.
The example Zizek uses to describe the connection between the symptom and
enjoyment is a slip of the tongue. A slip of the tongue “causes discomfort and
displeasure when it occurs, but we embrace its interpretation with pleasure; we explain
gladly to others the meaning of our slips; their ‘intersubjective recognition’ is usually a
source of intellectual satisfaction ”(Zizekl989:74) Lacan’s formulation of the
symptom as an ontological entity stems from the pleasurable sensation of its return.

31 have capitalized and placed this term in quotation marks to bring attention to the feet that I am referring
to Lacan’s notion o f the Real. A term used to describe that which exists beyond the scope o f language to
describe or approximate. A world from which the subject is irretrievably separated from upon entry into
language thus establishing subjectivity as a lack, and thus desire as a fundamental condition o f the subject.
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The subject gladly corrects him or herself in the case of slips of the tongue, explaining
what they actually meant with joy. So when Lacan states that the symptom is
“penetrated with enjoyment” he is referring to the psychic process of returning to an
original traumatic moment to confer meaning on that unassimilable moment of pain
through explanation. The subject returns to the point of trauma in the pleasure of
interpretation as opposed to re-experiencing the terror of the initial moment.
The symptom, as a slip of the tongue, although causing displeasure at the moment
it occurs immediately becomes a site of pleasure once it has been explained. The
explanation invites interpretation, moving us away from a description o f the original
encounter that actually demands explanation. We return to the trauma by way of its
symptom, its explanation. This covers over the initial trauma of the experience with a
surplus explanation that invites interpretation. Interpreting the symptom does not delve
into the true cause of the slip it involves an exploration of the explanation. This
protects the subject from having to explain the originary cause of the slip, a process that
involves re-experiencing the unassimilable encounter with the terrifying pleasures of
the “Real” through remembrance.
To return to the original analogy of the symptom as a contusion, the symptom
covers over the original traumatic event with a surplus of tissue, concealing the ori ginal
wound but marking it forever. We can speak of the symptom as an imperfection or scar
that covers over the initial wound but continually draws attention back to the site of
that wound. This excess “tissue” of the symptom prevents the subject from ever
forgetting the originary trauma. The site is marked but not assimilated into the
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subject’s knowledge of its self. The fact that the scar of the symptom bears the trace o f
the originary traumatic event, an event that resists signification, means that the subject
continually returns to the symptom in the psycho-analytic process. Through
psychoanalysis the analysand returns to the symptom as opposed to integrating the
actual trauma into the symbolic. This marks the point around which the subject has
organized his or her enjoyment. It is the transmutation of the subject’s understanding
of their symptom from a surplus explanation to an “isolated kernel of their
enjoyment”(Zizek:1991) that represents the transformation of the symptom into
sinthome, marking the end of the psychoanalytic process for Lacan. Zizek refers to this
as follows:
(The real is) that which resists symbolization: the traumatic point which is always missed
but none the less always returns, although we try, to integrate it into the symbolic order.
In the perspective o f the last stages o f Lacanian teaching, it is precisely the symptom
which is conceived as such a real kernel o f enjoyment, which persists as a surplus and
returns through all attempts to domesticate it, to gentrify it, to dissolve it by means of
explication, of putting-into-words its meaning.(Zizekl989:69)

The symptom as sinthome has a radically ontological status, providing the only
point around which subjectivity can be organized. Zizek makes this clear when he
states: “Symptom, conceived as sinthome, is literally our only substance, the only
positive support of our being, the only point that gives consistency to the
subject.”(Zizekl989:75) What is important to recognize is the relationship between the
symptom and existence. For, as Zizek makes clear, the symptom as that which shields
and separates us from the “Real” takes on the very character of that “Real” from which
it shields us. The symptom becomes an unassimilable signifier, a hidden kernel of
truth upon which we organize enjoyment and hence existence. The symptom, when
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articulated as a site of enjoyment, resists symbolization since its explication would
entail the breakdown of the symbolic order. Articulating the symptom forces the
subject to re-experience the terrifying encounter with the real through its articulation.
To explain the symptom is to explain the single kernel of truth upon which the subject
has organized their enjoyment, and hence their existence. Such an act would mean
succession to the death drive and the dissolution of the subject.
Symptom is the way we - the subjects - avoid madness, the way we choose something (the
symptom-formation) instead of nothing (radical psychotic autism, the destruction o f the symbolic
universe) through the binding o f our enjoyment to a certain signifying, symbolic formation which
assures a minimum o f consistency to our being-in-the world.(Zizekl989:75)

The psycho-analytic process comes to an end when the subject “identifies with
their symptom” because that is the moment the patient recognizes the foundation of
their being and the fundamental impossibility of understanding their subjectivity
through its explanation. Identification with the symptom provides the subject with
knowledge of the point around which all their enjoyment revolves, establishing a
consistency to their being in the form of complete knowledge of their self but not of
their subjectivity. “The analysis achieves its end when the patient is able to recognize,
in the Real of his symptom, the only support of his being. ”(Zizekl989:75). And the
phrase Lacan uses to describe this point around which the subject organizes their beingin-the-world is referred to as the “object petit ‘a’”.
By discussing Lacan’s conception of the “object petit a” we return to gender and
to the practices of the transgender community because this term describes the form of
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the relationship between the subject and the object cause of its desire4. This translates
into the articulation of the relationship between the transgender(ist) as a subject, and
the attainment of his or her desired ends, the social identity of the gender category
opposite their sex. In other words Lacan’s concept allows us to look at the object that
is being signified by the transgender community as a sign while keeping in mind the
inability of the subject to attain that object by means of its signifiers. Through Lacan’s
articulation of the symptom and of “the object petit a”, we can begin to speak of the
sartorial and surgical manipulation of the signifiers of gender and sex as the expression
of a desire - a desire stemming from a lack in the symbolic system. As in the case of
the symptom this lack is covered over by an excess of signifiers that continually fall
short of describing and hence attaining the object they describe. Viewing gender as this
excess of signification covering over a lack calls for a re-reading of Bolin’s argument
since the object Bolin claims to be represented by the transgender community, a third
gender, might be more appropriately understood as an effect of signification that takes
the form of a third gender retro-actively. Such a re-reading looks at cross-dressing as
being organized by an economy of enjoyment and not a political agenda. Incorporating
enjoyment into our understanding of cross-dressing enables the persistence of
masculine and feminine expressions in the transgender community to be explained.
What is desired by the transgender community is not the deactivation of gender but the
enjoyment of living as a member of the gender opposite to one’s sex. This repositions

4 “Object cause of desire” is the Lacanian term used to describe the literal object we desire, and not the
signifier o f that object. It is important to note that the attainment o f the object cause o f desire is an
impossibility for Lacan. Lacan believes we are separated from this object by the symbolic network of
language. All we can know o f this object is our desire for its signifier, which always occupies a relational
position to other signifiers and has not relationship to the object itself
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the place of the commodity in our understanding of the transgender community,
locating its meaning as the expression of desire and not in its use-value.
But for now let’s begin with a description of Lacan’s term for die point around
which one’s being-in-the-world is organized, “the object petit ‘a’“ I will begin with its
definition as it is described by Jaques-Alain Miller, editor of Lacan’s book The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. According to Miller:
The ‘a’ in question stands for ‘autre’ (other), the concept having been developed out of
the Freudian ‘object’ and Lacan’s own exploitation o f ‘otherness’. The ‘petit a’ (small a)
differentiates the object from (while relating it to) the ‘Autre’ o f‘Grand Autre’ (the
capitalized ‘Other’). However, Lacan refiises to comment on either term here, leaving the
reader to develop an appreciation of the concept in the course of their use. Furthermore,
Lacan insists that ‘object petit a’ should remain untranslated, thus acquiring, as it were,
the status o f an algebraic sign.( Miller in Lacan)

After reading the above statement the impossibility of understanding the ‘a’
without understanding Lacan’s conception of the relationship between the subject and
object is obvious. In Lacanian thought, the relationship between the subject and the
object is always characterized by a lack due to the inability of any signifying system to
ever accurately describe reality. This means the signifier can never provide the means
for attaining the material object it represents. This inherent lack endemic to all
symbolic systems establishes desire as a component part of the subject. The subject
upon entry into the symbolic order of language is separated from the objects that cause
and hence can fulfill its desire. We can understand this lack in the symbolic network as
bringing the subject into being by establishing desire as the organizing principle around
which subjectivity develops. Because of this lack the subject emerges as a desiring
being - a being that can only experience objects as they are symbolized yet is acted
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upon and influenced by actual material objects. The thing, or object in and of itself
remains unknown and unattainable with the capacity for conscious thought being an
effect of entry into the same network of signifiers naming the objects of the material
world. We are denied access to that which is promised by the sign because we are part
and parcel of the symbolic system that describes the world in which we live. The
signifier seems to promise access to the object it describes but this is an impossibility
because it is part of an over all imperfect system. The signifier always falls short of its
promise. Desire can never be satiated. We may attain the signifiers of what we desire
but never the object which would put an end to desire itself.
Zizek describes Lacan’s understanding of the relationship between the subject and
the object through the myth of the Tortoise and the Hare. In this description the Hare is
to be understood as representative o f language as a symbolic system with the tortoise
representing the material objects of the real world. The Hare, although much faster
than the Tortoise, can never attain the Tortoise. The Hare may overtake the Tortoise,
leaving him behind but he can never succeed in catching him. If the Hare were to catch
the Tortoise desire would be fulfilled and the game would end. Instead the Hare and
the Tortoise are locked in a scheme in which the Hare is always “too fast or too slow”
and thereby prevented from attaining the Tortoise, which would end the game. “The
paradox stages the relation of the subject to the object-cause [the material thing
existing in the world] of its desire, which can never be attained. The object-cause is
always missed; all we can do is encircle it.”(Zizekl992:4) What happens is a
displacement. We displace our desire for the object-cause onto the symbol or name for
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the object-cause of desire. The symbol, or name, for our desire stands in for the actual
object-cause thus becoming “the object petit a”.
As a result of desire “the object petit a” is always a surplus. It is continually
asked to fill a hole, or that which is lacking, in the symbolic network. It is this overdetermined quality of “the object petit a” that explains Lacan’s desire to leave the
phrase untranslated. For in leaving “the object petit a” untranslated the phrase retains
the form of an algebraic symbol. Untranslated ‘the object petit a’ illustrates the
meaninglessness of the phrase itself. So just as ‘the object petit a’ is always standing in
as a replacement for the actual object-cause of desire, the phrase, in its untranslated
form, has no meaning absent of the referent to which it is linked in description. Only
by remaining untranslated is the unique relationship between the subject, desire, and
desire’s object-cause retained as it is described. So when Zizek describes ‘a’ as, “An
empty form filled out by everyone’s fantasy.”(Zizekl991:134), “the object petit a” can
be understood as the sign that stands in for that which cannot be signified.
It is the capacity of Lacanian thought and of his notion of the ‘a’ that poses
interesting questions to Bolin and her conception of gender. “The object a” as both a
psychological formation and an algebraic sign describes what we are looking at when
we see gender in the symbolic constructions of the transgender community. In other
words, gender does not exist prior to its construction in the symbolic statements made
by subjects. The primacy of gender as a site of cultural organization must be
understood as an effect of the symbolic system in which subjects express themselves
and not as the result of an ideology with historical origins. The dangers of confusing
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the effects of signification with universalist assumptions is illustrated by Joan Copjec
who states”
It is important not to confuse the object ‘a’ with some poetical or essentialist notion o f the
subject. This object does not proceed the statement but is instead its retroactive effect,
the surplus that overruns what is said and that ‘always comes back to the same place’,
always designates the same thing - again, retroactively - no matter how self contradictory
the statements that produce it.(Copjec: 143)

Bolin has confused the contradictory nature of the statements made by the
transgender(ists) as expressing the poetical notion liberation. Yes, the transgender
community does juxtapose the signifiers of one gender with those of the opposite sex
but this does not equal expressing a new, liberated identity. Instead this act expresses
the same gender categories over and over again. In Bolin’s case the object, gender, is
assumed to be an essential characteristic of the subject when in fact the assemblage of
signifiers representing gender need to be understood as a surplus covering over a lack
in the symbolic system. In this way we can understand gender as ‘the object petit a’
since it “names the void of that unattainable surplus”(Zizekl991:134) By
understanding gender as an ‘object petit a’, as an embelished object standing in for that
which canot be signified, we can articulate the practices of the transgender community
as an ‘identification with their sinthome’. Such an understanding describes how the
transgender community has organized their being around an essential kernel of
enjoyment, illustrating the illusory nature of subjectivity and how Lacan’s formulation
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of the subject operates to reposition the commodity in studies, such as Bolin’s, dealing
with identity.
In order to understand how the transgender community’s practices can be
understood as an ‘identification with their sinthome’ we need to turn to the statements
in Bolin’s text in which the subjects actually describe their own identity. What
becomes apparent is an awareness on the part of the transgender community of the
impossibility of the signifiers of gender to express their subjectivity. The most telling
example of this is seen in the words of Joan, a thirty nine year old biological male, who
describes him/herself as follows.
I’m a transsexual. I’m different from many in that I do not, at this time at least, feel a
need to fede into society and hide my past. Rather I have come out to all around me,
family, friends and co-workers ...I’m not yet living as a woman full time, but I am just
starting a part-time job where I’ll be doing a job as Joan. On my regular job (three days a
week), I’m still Jerry. I don’t really believe that I’m a “woman trapped in a man’s body.”
I’m not sure what I am, only that making this transition is more important to me than
anything else in my life.(Bolinl 994:464)

For Bolin this statement illustrates the increased flexibility of the newly emerging
gender paradigm. It solidifies her claim that it is now possible for a biological male to
exist as a third gender, removing the need to surgically transform one’s body to live
socially as a female. From the Lacanian perspective, one that calls into question the
capacity of the subject to attain the desired object, what becomes immediately apparent
is the recognition on Joan’s part of the lack inherent to the signifying system. Joan is
perfectly well aware of the fact that what she/he is cannot be described. In light of this
the importance of Joan’s statement shifts from her expression of the wish to live
socially as a female to the fact that Joan doesn’t know what she is while continuing to

74

desire being identified as feminine. For Joan the signifiers of gender are more
important than the object. Joan is not interested in attaining the object femininity
promised by the arrangement of signifiers she has assembled. She knows assembling
the signifiers of femininity does not equal becoming a different gender. Instead
femininity has become an embellished object of desire for Joan.
In Joan’s uncertainty we can see the awareness that even though he/she may attain
the sign of the desired object, i.e. living as a woman socially, Joan is well aware that
the sign is not the actual thing he/she desires. And living as the sign of that object is
not the same as being that object. Yet it is also important to recognize the continued
longing for the object-cause of Joan’s desire. This continued longing for the objectcause of desire depicted by Joan’s drive to make the transition from living as a male to
living as a female shows Joan’s love for the surplus of embellished signifiers covering
the hole in the signifying system. What Joan has articulated is the classic conception of
‘the object petit a’, a love for and fascination with the material signifiers of that which
cannot be signified.
The fact that “this transition [from male to female] is more important to [Joan]
than anything else in life” signals the moment in which Joan has “become her
symptom”. Even in light of the known impossibility of attaining the object-cause of
desire, the feminine gender6, Joan’s desire for the signifiers bearing the trace of this
unattainable “Real” persists. Joan has organized her being-in-the-worid around the
surplus of signifiers representing femininity even in light of the known impossibility of

6 An interesting side note is that it doesn’t have to be understood as the feminine gender that Joan is
desiring. It can be understood as simply “gender” that is desired and femininity is the form this desire has
taken due to its position in the symbolic network as an impossibility.
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attaining their promise. Joan has replaced the desire for the “Real” promised by the
signs with the reality of the signifier. To explain away this desire through its
assimilation into the symbolic would be to dissolve the kernel of enjoyment around
which Joan has organized her existence. Cross-dressing, at least for Joan, is an act
penetrated with enjoyment, and cannot be viewed as stemming from the political
agendas of an agential subject.
A Lacanian understanding of cross-dressing repositions the role of the commodity
form in the practice of cross-dressing. It is removed from its central location as a
catalyst enabling the emergence of new identities and placed within a grammatical
structure organized by desire. From the Lacanian perspective gender becomes a
property of the commodity form as opposed to an object represented by the commodity.
The commodity form, whose qualities are established by its relationship to other
signifiers, defines the object gender by encircling a lack in the symbolic system. This
excess of signification established by this lack becomes the object gender with the
promise of an actual quality upon which to organize subjectivity becoming a
phantasmic quality of the commodity form and its location in a symbolic sequence.
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Chapter Five:
Whose Crisis is Being Represented?

“Twentieth-century social and cultural anthropology has promised its still largely Western
readership enlightenment on two fronts. The one has been the salvaging o f distinct
cultural forms o f life from a process o f apparent global Westernization....The other
promise o f anthropology, one less fully distinguished and attended to than the first, has
been to serve as a form o f cultural critique for ourselves. In using portraits o f other
cultural patterns to reflect self-critically on our own ways, anthropology disrupts common
sense and makes us reexamine our taken-for-granted assumptions.”(Marcusl986:1)

In the above passage George Marcus describes the reason anthropology is done.
Marcus’s statement begins his book, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, a work
exploring the contemporary debate surrounding the epistemological problems
associated with representing different social organizations in writing. For Marcus this
debate hinges on a crisis of representation stemming from developments in the fields of
philosophy and literary criticism which call into question the capability to accurately
describe social reality. Questions of this sort strike deep at the heart of anthropology
since ethnography is based on the assumption that different social realities can be
described in writing. It is assumed ethnographic descriptions are factual
representations, and if not a close facsimile to the social reality in which the
anthropologist conducted his or her field-work
The crisis stems from questions pertaining to the possibility of attaining an
objective position from which to view social reality. The empiricism formerly relied
upon by the social sciences for the positivistic study of society has been shown to be an
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impossibility, reflecting more the desires of the researcher and the concerns of the field
than the dynamics of the actual encounter. The portrayal of empiricism in written
accounts of field work is now viewed as politically suspect due to the altered image of
the encounter necessitated by its portrayal in objective terms. The conventions of the
field demanding empirical descriptions are now considered to objectify those whose
lives are represented by the text. This crisis has been understood as one of
representation since what is at question is the capacity of symbolic systems such as
language or film to produce accurate images of the subjects they seek to depict. These
mediums are now known to depend on culturally specific symbolic systems for the
production of meaning and are not seen as value neutral forms of communication.
Elevating questions of description to the level of theoretical reflection brings to the
center of discussion the effect discursive practices have on determining the image
produced. We now see the stylistic formalities of ethnography and the structure of
language as determining the image of the subject described.
In the effort to address these questions of representation anthropologists have
incorporated literary theory and interpretive philosophy into their understanding and
analysis of the social world. The incorporation of these two fields has had a profound
impact on the practice of writing ethnography, drastically changing both the form and
content of the genre. For the most part ethnography is no longer considered to be
guided by empiricism. Empiricism in ethnography is now recognized as being a
stylistic formality demanded by the writing practices of the field and as a tool for
establishing the authority of the author rather than a methodology that ensures the
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accuracy of field accounts. Contemporary ethnography is now directed by the writing
styles of the humanities and by the concerns of interpretive philosophy rather than the
empiricism of its heritage. This trend can be seen in the work of Bolin and Hebdige,
whose ethnographic accounts engage literary theory and hermeneutic philosophy in
their portrayals of subjectivity. Both author’s work can be described as experimental
since their incorporation of hermeneutics is guided by the effort to overcome the crisis
of representation by developing approaches to ethnography that circumvent the
problems associated with representing social reality. And in keeping with the tradition
of anthropology, these authors have produced studies that are critical of contemporary
societal practices. These texts can be read as responses to the political concerns of
representation, with the separate texts serving as examples in which different
techniques of interpretation and presentation have been used to avoid objectifying the
subjects represented in ethnography. It is the intent of this chapter to show how these
texts falter, coming up short of their goal and to describe a possible alternative offered
by Lacanian psycho-analytic theory.
The spirit of experimentation guiding these studies can be seen in the vocabulary
and structure of Bolin’s argument. Bolin describes the practices of the transgender
community as “deconstructing” the dominant gender paradigm, invoking the
vocabulary and reading techniques of contemporary literary theory. The use of
deconstruction as a framework guiding ethnographic studies is indicative of new
approaches in field work because it represents a reconfiguration of the relationship
between the anthropologist and the subject of study. Bolin approaches her subjects as
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one approaches a text. She assumes the actions of the transgender community are
ordered and structured like a language. These actions and practices are assumed to be
symbolic of larger cultural logics that organize everyday life just as grammar orders
speech utterances. Due to this arrangement Bolin is able to read the practices of the
transgender community as one reads a text. And in this case Bolin considers her
reading to illuminate how the practices of the transgender community “deconstruct” the
ideological system constructing our gender categories. Articulating the transgender
community’s practices as a text which “deconstructs” gender defines Bolin’s position
in relation to her subjects. In positioning herself as a reader she is locating herself as a
detached observer separated from the lives of those she studies.
In order to understand how Bolin’s position as a “reader” of the transgender
community’s text defines her relationship to the subjects of her study we need to return
to the example she provides of her affinities to the transgender community as an
anthropologist. In the following example it can be seen how her identity as an
anthropologist is situated in relation to the subjects in her study.
At both the transgender community conferences I attended, symposia were organized that
included historical and cross-cultural aspects o f cross-dressing. At the National
Transgender Annual Meetings, I was invited as an anthropologist to present cross-cultural
evidence o f cross-dressing. Members of the audience were most interested in two topics:
the kinds o f data that identified the Berdache as a high-status position and the question o f
how Berdache are conceptualized as a third or alternative gender mitigating against
clinical typologies.(Bolinl994:476)

In this statement we see Bolin identifying herself as a subject, with the “I”
representing the anthropologist invited to conventions as an authority on gender and
cross cultural evidence of cross-dressing. Bolin assumes the evidence she presents is
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being used by the transgender community as the raw material for the construction of
identity. As was shown earlier, this assumption pertaining to the use-value of
anthropological knowledge depicts the transgender(ist) as an agential subject. What
was not previously addressed is the effect of this assumption for Bolin’s own
subjectivity. Bolin, as the producer of the knowledge consumed by the transgender
community, is also assumed to be an agential subject. It is assumed that she as the
producer of this knowledge is an authority whose status enables her to see the truth
about the transgender community’s practices. Bolin’s role as a producer of knowledge
makes her transcendent. Bolin, as a subject, remains a unified being who enters into
her own text as an authority, as one whose position is never risked by its encounter with
an “other”. T he‘T ’ who speaks at transgender conventions is a stable entity whose
gaze defines the subjects of her study by bringing them into view as a third gender
category. The problem with this arrangement, one directly attributable to the
theoretical position from which she speaks, is its production of self identical subjects.
This is seen in both her assumption that th e ‘T ’ through which she enters her own text
represents her as a subject, just as the “you” that she is writing about identifies with the
image of the transgender community she presents in her text. For Bolin, both she and
the transgendered subject are self identical with their representation in her text,
establishing a uniformity between subjects where none might exist.
The problems with producing a text in which the subjects are assumed to
recognize themselves in their own image is similar to the problem found with
Hebdige’s text, one in which he described the subject’s mis-recognition of their image
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as a failure on the part of his text. But as was discussed earlier, the problem with his
text is not that the subjects fail to recognize themselves in their own image, but in the
reason he posits for this phenomenon. He attributes the failure of his text to produce a
self same image of the punks as the work of ideology. According to Hebdige, ideology
operates to veil the true social relationships being expressed in the practices of
subculture. In a sense Hebdige believes subjects are duped into believing they are not
the carrier of the truth he claims they are. But, an alternative interpretation of this
phenomenon is to attribute this fai lure of recognition to a fundamental characteristic of
the subject, the capacity to continually deny the validity of their image as it is produced
by a gaze. Both the production of self-identical subjects and subjects that deny the
validity of their own image due to ideology, "trap” the subject in representation.
Trapping the subject in representation denies the subject the capacity to question its
own image. The result is the mis-representation of the subject through the ascription of
a positive function to the gaze. The gaze of Hebdige and the gaze of Bolin are assumed
to function positively, to bring the subject into being. Literally the gaze is assumed to
make the subject visible. Such an assertion results in the conflation of effect and
realization, with ideology being recognized as that which produces reality as opposed
to falsifying it in a veil of representation.(Copjecl994) This posits the authority to
define the subjectivity of the other in the gaze of the author who describes that other.
The alternative is to embrace the psychoanalytic conception of the subject as an entity
that continually evades representation and thereby questions the authority of the
author’s gaze.

82

As articulated in psycho-analysis the subject is understood as never being present
in its representation. Representation is always viewed as an effect, as a secondary
process of subjectivity mediated by language. The subject itself cannot be found in its
articulation. The experience of the subject is condensed and disfigured as it is
translated into language due to the inability of signifying systems such as language to
accurately represent reality. This shifts the search for the subject from the contents of
its articulations to the form taken by these articulations. In psycho-analysis the
emphasis is placed on the form of subjectivity as it is brought into being by a speaking
subject. This makes all representations of subjectivity questionable, and the authority
of an author who describes the subject dubious at best since not even the subject is an
authority on its own representation. Calling into question all representations of
subjectivity gives the subject the freedom to question its own image as it is represented
by another subject. Zizek refers to this phenomenon as the capacity of the subject to
always pose a question to its own image. Allowing the subject this capacity in
representation avoids trapping the subject in the gaze of the author. According to Zizek
the subject continually asks, “che vuoi? (who me?)” when confronted by its own image,
questioning the authority of the gaze in whose light it is being represented. We can see
this process taking place in Hebdige’s work when he describes the shortcoming of his
text. Hebdige states:
It is highly unlikely that the members o f any o f the subcultures described in this book
would recognize themselves reflected here. They are still less likely to welcome any
efforts on our part to understand them....We should hardly be surprised to find our
‘sympathetic’ readings o f subordinate culture are regarded by the members o f a subculture
with just as much indifference and contempt as the hostile labels imposed by the courts
and the press. In this respect, to get the point is to miss the point.(Hebdigel 979:139)
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According to Hebdige the fact that his text is likely to be viewed with derision
and scorn signals his text’s failure to bridge the gap between language, experience, and
reality since the subjects do not recognize themselves in their image as it has been
portrayed in the text. In Hebdige’s work this failure of recognition operates as
evidence for the truth of Hebdige’s reading of subculture. According to Hebdige his
theoretical apparatus has produced such an exact representation of the subject of
subculture that he or she cannot recognize themselves. Ideology prevents such
recognition. The subjects of subculture are trapped by ideology. But Hebdige as a
transcendent subject is not. He can see through ideology and into the true meaning of
subculture. He “gets the point”, he knows what subculture means, but this meaning
cannot be assimilated into subculture because to do so would be to dissolve it.
Subculture must deny that Hebdige has caught its image. As was shown earlier in this
reading of subculture the authority to determine the meaning of subculture resides
squarely in the gaze of Hebdige.
The psycho-analytic interpretation of the subjects failure to recognize themselves
in the text removes Hebdige from the position of authority and also questions the
capacity of the subject to be an authority on its own representation. The psycho
analytic reading does not claim that subculture is blind to the true meaning of its acts,
as Hebdige claims, but acknowledges the capacity of the subject to see its image in the
text - an image that reflects the perspective o f a gaze. Psycho-analysis then takes into
consideration the subject’s capacity to deny the authority of that gaze, giving the
subject the autonomy to formulate itsself absent of the terms mandated by an “other’s”
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gaze. This is different from saying members of subculture are fully aware of the
meaning of their actions. It simply gives the subject the freedom to evade its
entrapment in the gaze of an “other”.
From the psycho-analytic perspective it is obvious that the image of subculture
painted in Hebdige’s text would be viewed with derision. It operates in the same
fashion as the labels from the courts and the press do, as an imposition that continually
subordinates subculture to the authority of an outside gaze. The fact that this image is
held in contempt comes from the subject escaping the authority of that gaze. If the
subject had not escaped these images would not be held in contempt or derision but in
the love of narcissism. The images and labels provided by Hebdige’s text would
illustrate that the subject of subculture had achieved its desired ends, the construction
of difference. And the contempt of society would be justified since that would be the
intention of their actions. To come to this conclusion would be to take the message of
subculture at face value and would assume that subjects operate with complete
knowledge of their actions. Recognizing the subject’s capacity to question their
appearance in another’s gaze exposes desire and the operation of the gaze by
illustrating how representation comes from a demand being placed on the subject.
Incorporating the capacity of the subject to ask “che vuoi” into our understanding of the
subject reconfigures our understanding of textual representations by revealing the effect
of desire in description. When such studies as those of Hebdige and Bolin are shown
to be infused with desire the image painted of the subject takes the form of a demand.
The punks see their image in Hebdige’s text, they look at it and ask “che vuoi?” [Who
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Me?], then respond with: ‘You’re telling me that, but what do you want with it, what
are you aimingat?”(Zizekl9989:111) By exposing the desire behind this
representation, this question denies the authority of Hebdige’s gaze to represent them in
any light.
For Lacan this demand posed to the subject by an author locates desire,
illuminating how the author demands something from the subject which the subject
cannot provide. The question “che vuoi” asks the author, “what do you really want,
what are you aiming at through this demand?”(Zizekl989:l 11) So when Hebdige or
Bolin produce texts in which the subjects either recognize themselves, as in the case of
Bolin, or fail to recognize themselves, as with Hebdige, we need to ask questions
concerning the desire of the author. By asking why they presented the subjects of their
study in such a fashion we can understand where we might find the subject being
represented in the text. Finding where the subject resides in these representations
enables questions to be explored concerning the political implications of
representation. And just as Hebdige’s mis-representation of subculture has been argued
to be problematic we need to view Bolin’s presentation of self-same subjects as equally
questionable. It will be shown that building an argument around the assumption that
the image produced by your text will be self identical to the subject traps the subject in
the same way as the claim that ideology prevents the subject from recognizing
themselves in the image of the text. Both deny the subject the capacity to ask che
vuoi?, and thereby miss the subject whose representation is sought. As was seen with
Hebdige, the demand that subjects be self same also locates the author’s desire with the
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production of self same images equaling a demand to present the subject in a certain
light. And in Bolin’s case, the light in which she presents her subjects is one in which
she remains a stable fixture, an “I” that is unchallenged and unified.
How does Bolin’s production of self identical subjects expose desire and in so
doing the failure of the text to accurately portray subjectivity? Returning to the work of
Joan Copjec and her analysis of the “Orthopsychic Subject” provides the answer. As
will be seen what is at stake is more than the portrayal of subjectivity, but the position
of the author in ethnographic accounts. In order to show how the position of the author
is at stake in representations of subjectivity we need to refer again to Lacan’s diagram
of the two interpenetrating triangles. This diagram describes the relationship between
‘the gaze’ and ‘the subject of representation’, illustrating how Lacan’s understanding of
the gaze takes into account both the perspective of the author who does the
representing as well as the subject that is being represented.

The Subject
of R epresentation

The G aze

(Figure 2. Diagram o f the Lacanian gaze)

As the diagram illustrates, for Lacan, both positions are equally constructed by the gaze
emanating from the other. And, as we can see in the diagram Bolin has failed to take

87

into account the effect of her gaze in constructing both the subjects she is representing
as well as the “I” representing herself, two positions constructed by the gaze of an
always present third position.7 The failure to consider her position as an “I” in
language as being a position constructed by the same gaze that illuminates the
transgender community as constructed subjects, perpetuates the image of the
anthropologist as a unified “Renaissance subject”. It assumes the anthropologist
possesses transcendent capabilities that allow alterity to be described as a construction
while denying the constructed nature of their own position. The Lacanian alternative
emphasizes the primacy of the gaze as a determinant in the subjectivity of both the
being who identifies with the “I” of language and those who are described by th at‘T ’.
Perhaps the phrase which describes Bolin’s mistake most accurately, and one which
illustrates the primacy of the gaze in Lacan’s thought is: “The gaze is that which
‘determines’ the I in the visible; it is ‘the instrument through which...[the] I [is] photographed .’’(Copjec 1994:31)
From the Lacanian perspective th e ‘T ’ of language with which Bolin identifies
needs to be viewed as a construction of an outside gaze. For Lacan, the “I” of language
with which Bolin is identifying herself is the representation of a constructed position
whose qualities Bolin has co-opted as her own, making the transcendent position she
assumes as a producer of knowledge a quality of her subjectivity. The “Renaissance
perspective” of this “F’ does not exist in the subject who identifies with it. Rather, the
“Renaissance perspective” claimed by Bolin is a promise of the signifying system, an

7 The third position constructing both o f these positions would be represented in the diagram by the eye of
the reader who is viewing the diagram. Lacan refers to this eye as the eye o f the “grand Other”.
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effect of signification due to the position of the signifier, “F \ in language. In Bolin’s
case she has taken over the attributes of the “I”, assuming that she, Ann Bolin the
subject, is self identical to the “I” of language. This conflation between th e “F
representing the gaze and the subject, ‘AnnBolin’, denies a fundamental characteristic
of signification, the impossibility of accurately signifying the subject. When Bolin
assumes the position of the “I” representative of the speaking subject in language, she
presumes that “I” to be a self identical image of herself as a speaking subject. She is
locating herself at the point of the gaze. And as Copjec points out, “The subject, in
short, cannot be located or locate itself at the point of the gaze, since this point marks,
on the contrary, its very annihilation. ”(Copjecl994:35) To occupy the point of the gaze
is to occupy the position of the hysteric, with the subject assuming the mandated
position of language as their own as opposed to a position necessarily occupied for
communication. The subject cannot be located at the point of the gaze because it is an
unoccupiable point, one that figures as an unrealizable ideal of a subject that is not split
upon entry into language. To occupy the point of the gaze denies the primacy of the
system o f signification and assumes that there is something behind the field of
signifiers that can be obtained or captured by that field of signifiers. Lacan refers to
Bolin’s position as “being trapped in the imaginary” and is representative of her failure
to recognize the deceptive quality of the subject who continually asks ‘che vuoi?’.
Lacan understands Bolin’s position as hysterical because by identifying with the
“I” of language, the “F of the gaze, Bolin is occupying an imaginary point, the point to
which the transgendered subject addresses their ‘che vuoi’ question. Occupying this
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point represents a split between demand and desire. When Bolin speaks as an authority
on gender and its construction cross-culturally she in turn is being interrogated by the
subjects to whom she is turning for knowledge. By occupying this point, and
representing herself as that point in her text, Bolin’s demand for knowledge is split
from her desire: an unknown variable illuminated by the transgendered subject’s
question ‘che vuoi?’ question. In other words, Bolin is telling the transgender
community something about themselves and in turn is being confronted by a question
that returns from the audience, a question that asks, “You’re telling me this, but what
do you want with it, what are you aiming at?”(Zizekl989:111) This question reveals
Bolin’s desire, an unknown variable prior to the emergence of “che vuoi” question,
illuminating how her demand for knowledge placed to the transgendered subject is
misdirected. Bolin is actually asking that her demand be refuted because her demand
for knowledge is not what she actually wants. Bolin wants her desire fulfilled and not
knowledge from the subjects of her study. This is the position of the hysteric because
Bolin is demanding one thing but wanting another. She believes her desire can be
fulfilled by demanding knowledge from the transgender community while in fact no
amount of knowledge will ever fulfill her desire. She is misplacing her desire to be a
unified being onto the knowledge of gender the transgender community appears to be
able to supply.
From the Lacanian perspective Bolin’s identification with the “I” of language
represents an identification with “the master”, or “the name of the father”, since
identification with the “F’ of language represents becoming the subject mandated by
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the gaze. Identifying with this point gives Bolin a “symbolic mandate” to interrogate
the transgender community. Zizek describes this situation as follows:
The subject is always fastened, pinned to a signifier which represents him [sic] for the
other, and through this pinning he [sic] is loaded with a symbolic mandate, he is given a
place in the intersubjective network o f symbolic relations.”(Zizekl989:l 13)

In Bolin’s case the signifier to which she has pinned herself as a subject is the
authoritative “I” representative o f a “Renaissance” perspective in language. The place
in the symbolic network to which this association fastens Bolin is the position of the
master or teacher - a master or teacher who views the transgendered subject from the
imaginary point of the gaze. The problem with constructing an ethnographic account
from this position is that it serves to reify the authority of the gaze while appearing to
deconstruct the position of the other. Bolin’s incorporation of literary theory and
interpretive philosophy into her ethnographic portrayal results in the establishment of a
new Master - a master who retains the authority of the “I” over that of the other.
The alternative, posed by Lacan, is to recognize the radically textual quality of
being, to embrace the idea that being is to be a being-of-language. Embracing the
Lacanian claim leads to the dissolution of the hysteria associated with building an
ethnography around the point of the gaze by incorporating the impossibility of
identifying with th e ‘T ’ of language into representation. Recognizing that the subject
cannot fulfill the symbolic mandate is to recognize that there is nothing beyond the
signifying network. Once this is achieved, the assumption that there exists an ‘object in
subject’ such as gender that resists interpretation is done away with. This alternative
position is described by Copjec when she states:
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Lacan argues that beyond the signifying network, beyond the visual field, there is, in fact,
nothing at all. The veil o f representation actually conceals nothing; there is nothing behind
representation. Yet the feet that representation seems to hide, to put an arbored screen o f
signifiers in front o f something hidden beneath, is not treated by a simple error the subject
can undo; nor is this deceptiveness o f language treated as something that undoes the
subject, deconstructs its entity by menacing its boundaries. Rather, language’s opacity is
taken as the very cause of the subject’s being, that is, its desire, or want-tobe.(Copjecl994:35)

We can now answer the question as to why Bolin desired to represent the subjects of
her study as she did. She represented the transgendered subject as agential because she
desires to be a unified entity that is not cut off from “The Real” by language.
If the occupation of the position of the hysteric produces ethnography that
searches for and finds a new authority in the “I” of the “Master” or “Grand Other”,
what about Hebdige? Hebdige’s text, in spite of its short-comings, actually ends by
producing a convincing portrayal of subculture, providing a potential avenue for future
representations of alterity. The irony is that where Lacan would find strength in
Hebdige’s approach, Hebdige himself finds weakness. In order to understand how
Hebdige’s work illuminates a potential direction for future ethnographic research we
need to go back and investigate the faults Hebdige finds in his text, because herein lies
the Lacanian answer to the crisis of representation.
According to Hebdige, his text is a failure because it cannot bridge the gap
between “language, experience, and reality”(Hebdigel979:10) This is the root of his
text’s shortcomings, ending in his need to apologize both to his reader as well as to the
objects of his study. But what is in this gap? Is it really about, as Hebdige claims, the
hope that the seam between reality and experience could be located and pried open
through a semiotic analysis? That the “gulf between the alienated intellectual and the
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‘real’ world could be rendered meaningful and miraculously, at the same time, be made
to disappear. ”(Hebdigel979:10)? Or is this the expression of a desire? A desire which
cannot possibly be fulfilled due to the situatedness of the subject as a “being in
language”? In order to answer these questions we need to return to Hebdige’s text, re
reading his work while keeping in mind the effect of desire in determining the image of
subculture painted by Hebdige. This involves a discussion of methodology, since it is
the method employed by Hebdige that contains the seeds of promise for circumventing
the crisis of representation.
As it turns out Hebdige’s text is less about subculture than it is about developing
an approach to studying culture. Hebdige’s study of subculture is a study that explores
the strengths and weaknesses of viewing and interpreting culture in the terms
established by literary theory. In his text, Hebdige develops an understanding of
subculture based upon what is known about reading texts. As with Bolin, Hebdige
reads cultural practices as the symbolic representation of underlying social relations as
they are expressed in everyday events. Only, unlike Bolin, Hebdige focuses strictly on
the stylistic expressions of his subjects. Hebdige looks for the truth pertaining to the
social relationships of capitalism as they are expressed in the stylistic ensembles of
subculture. He is not looking for something that exists inside his subjects but
something expressed by the form of their stylistic displays. Where Bolin saw the
stylistic ensembles of the transgender community expressing an essential quality of
being, Hebdige sees the expression of specific historical social relationships. Hebdige
never attempts to dive beneath the surface expressions of style. For Hebdige semiotics
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provides the framework guiding this encounter by providing a view of social relations
as a symbolic system. Through semiotics social relations can be viewed as a structured
representation of the whole culture. The intent of this project is two fold. One, it
hopes to develop a moral philosophy in which the practices of daily life are
problematized and shown to be part of larger exercises of power on the part of society’s
dominant. And second: it hopes to isolate mechanisms of domination, illuminating the
internal relationships between domination and the practices of everyday life for the
purpose of facilitating change. The intent is to re-position our understanding of
societal practices in order to incite social change.
This approach, as with Bolin’s, insists culture is a text organized and structured
like a language. The network of symbols representing social relations are ordered by a
grammatical structure whose form contains a message separate from but integral to its
content. This means social processes can be understood in die same fashion as a
literary work. One can read to develop an understanding of society’s intricacies and
interconnections just as one reads to understands a literary work. Only, whereas Bolin
incorporates Derridean philosophy, whether accurately or inaccurately, imbuing
cultural formations with deconstructive capacities, Hebdige remains committed to a
conception of the real that allows for a moral philosophy of society. This distinction
can be seen in the employment of Marxist semiotics and in its application to the
analysis of class through the surface expressions of subculture in Hebdige’s study.
Hebdige makes this clear when he states:
Barthes’ notion o f culture extends beyond the library, the opera-house and the theater to
encompass the whole of everyday life. But this everyday life is for Barthes overlaid with a
significance which is at once more insidious and more systematically organized. Starting
from the premise that ‘myth is a type o f speech’, Barthes set out in Mythologies to
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examine the normally hidden set of rules, codes and conventions through which meanings
particular to specific social groups (i.e. those in power) are rendered universal and ‘given’
for the whole o f society.(Hebdigel979:9)

The strength of this “Cultural Studies” project is the emphasis placed on form as
opposed to content. The surface signifiers of social interactions are read to reveal the
symbolic logic’s ordering societal practices. Interestingly, while Hebdige champions
studying the formal properties of culture as opposed to the analysis of culture’s
contents, he is left empty by it. He is left disappointed and desiring the unification of
language, experience, and reality. This disappointment felt by Hebdige provides the
key to analyzing desire in Hebdige’s text since it illuminates the moment Hebdige’s
desire is not fulfilled. We can see Hebdige’s lack of fulfillment in his apology to the
academic community and to the objects of his study for producing a text that fails to
bridge the gap between reality and experience. It may seem that returning to
Hebdige’s apology is redundant and that this ground has already been covered, but I am
returning from a different theoretical perspective. This new perspective sheds a
different light on the ground already traveled. We can see this in Hebdige’s statement
that reads:
The study o f subcultural style which seemed at the outset to draw us back towards the real
world, to reunite us with ‘the people’, ends by merely confirming the distance between the
reader and the ‘text’, between everyday life and the ‘mythologist’ whom it surrounds,
fascinates and finally excludes. It would seem that we are still, like Barthes, ‘condemned
for some time yet to speak excessively about reality’.(Hebdigel979:140)

Hebdige views the failure of his text as hinging upon the necessity of prying open the
“invisible seam between language, experience and reality”(Hebdigel979:10). For
Hebdige anything less than making this “gulf’ disappear by “rendering it meaningful”
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constitutes a failure. The question that immediately springs to mind is: what
constitutes a successful text for Hebdige? What conditions need to be met for Hebdige
to be “happy” with his text? In short the development of a theoretical position that
unifies language, experience and reality. The development of such a theoretical
position in Lacanian terms would constitute locating the author at the point of the gaze.
Only by occupying the originary point of the gaze would the theoretical apparatus
situating the intellectual “in camera” to the text dissolve, creating a bridge over the gap
between language and reality. Once this gap has been bridged the intellectual, as
reader of social texts, can be situated in the text itself, rendering the images produced
through reflection self identical to the real world of experience. This is the same desire
as Bolin’s, and as was described before, represents the split desire of the hysteric.
We can understand Hebdige as occupying the position of the hysteric, just as
Bolin does, by tracing his desire to identify with the ‘T ’ of the symbolic network; or in
strict Lacanian terms, the “I” of the gaze of the Other. Hebdige is demanding from the
subject of subculture the fulfillment of his desire for unification with ‘the people’. Yet,
when confronted with the ‘che vuoi’ question from the subject - illustrated by the
deference of the subcultural subject to their image as it is presented back in the text Hebdige is shown to desire something else. Hebdige is shown to desire identification
with the point of the gaze that views both subculture and the intellectual. Hebdige
seeks a union with the “I” of the symbolic network separating him as a subject from the
real social relationships hidden behind the signifier. Such a union would result in the
attainment of the “Renaissance” perspective promised by the symbolic network of
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language, resulting in the attainment of the position of a punctiform being. This
condition represents a split between desire and demand because Hebdige is demanding
unification with ‘the people’ but desiring unification with the “F of language. And as
was shown earlier in the discussion of Bolin, unification with this point would amount
to the dissolution of the subject since to become that transcendent being would end
desire.
Hebdige views his failure in terms of a short-coming on the part of semiotics as a
theoretical matrix to pry open the ‘invisible seam’ separating reality from experience.
Hebdige’s sense of failure can be understood as a mistaken conceptualization of the
gaze. Hebdige is mistakenly looking for confirmation of his existence in the gaze of
the Other, asking that gaze to render his position as a subject meaningful. As a
consequence the gaze is ascribed with the positive function of giving meaning to the
signified. Ascribing a positive function to the gaze reduces the subject to a realization
of that gaze and attributes the power to bring the subject into being to the big Other.
Copjec refers to this phenomena as locating the ‘gaze in front’ of the image, a process
that associates the emergence of the subject with its signification. This traps the
subject in representation by positing a semblance between the subject and its signifier
that denies the subject the possibility of imagining a position outside the gaze. Hebdige
feels condemned because, by conceptualizing the gaze as fulfilling a positive function,
he and the subjects represented in his text are trapped in their own image as it is
presented to them by the gaze. Literally, as Hebdige conceptualizes the relationship
between the gaze and the subject, the language in which he must represent the subjects
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of subculture locks him in a position that denies access to the object of his desire. The
problem does not lie in the inability of Hebdige to obtain the object of his desire, but in
the assumption that there exists something beyond the signifier. That there is a real
sociality out there to be obtained behind the signifier that is not theoretical. The failure
Hebdige associates with his text has nothing to do with semiotics and all to do with his
conception of the gaze. For if the gaze did not serve the positive function of
recognition then the subject could be articulated as a phenomena of language and
Hebdige’s text would be a success.
Lacan offers an alternative explanation to this perceived failure, providing an
alternative conception of the relationship between the subject and the gaze. By
explaining the Lacanian conception of the gaze and its relationship to the subject, not
only can the crisis of representation referred to above to be addressed but the question
of the commodity form and its potential to act as a signifier of identity can be returned
to as well. Once the gaze is repositioned in relation to the subject and its signifier we
will see that the crisis of representation has less to do with the capacity to represent
social reality and more to do with the willingness of anthropologists (and other social
scientists) to sacrifice his or her position in the text - a position aligned with the gaze of
the big Other. Once the position of the anthropologist is removed from the originaiy
point of the gaze the radical potential of a Lacanian anthropology can be realized with
the textual quality of existence being brought to the forefront in ethnography. Placing
the textual quality of being at the center of ethnographic accounts enables the
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development of a truly post-structuralist ethnography in which culture is recognized as
an effect of signification with difference amounting to a matter of style.
In Lacan’s understanding, the gaze cannot be turned to for affirmation of any sort
because it does not see you. As is apparent from Lacan’s diagram of the two
interpenetrating triangles, the Lacanian gaze is located “behind the
image”(Copjecl994) What this means is that the “I” of the gaze with which Hebdige
and Bolin would like to identify is always cut off from the subject. It is an
unoccupiable point that cannot be signified. Copjec makes this clear when she states:
In Lacan, the gaze is located ‘behind’ the image, as that which fails to appear in it and thus
as that which makes all its meanings suspect...Lacan does not ask you to think of the gaze
as belonging to an Other who cares about what or where you are, who pries, keeps tabs
on your whereabouts, and takes note o f all your steps and missteps. When you encounter
the gaze o f the Other, you meet not a seeing eye but a blind one. The gaze is not clear or
penetrating, not filled with knowledge or recognition; it is clouded over and turned back
on itself, absorbed in its own enjoyment. The horrible truth is that the gaze does not see
you.(Copjecl994:36)

By locating the gaze behind the image Lacan sets up the visual field as always
expressing a lack. This lack is endemic to all signifying networks that represent reality.
The gaze is understood as always falling short of its promise for the clear and complete
illumination of an object. Incorporating lack into our understanding of the graphic
space of the gaze allows the subject to glean the possibility of a different perspective
from which the same space might be viewed. An awareness of this lack on the part of
the subject prevents the subject from ever being trapped by the gaze. It allows the
subject to ask: “What is being concealed from me? What in this graphic space does not
show, does not stop writing itself?”(Copjecl994:34) It is at this point in which
something appears to be missing from representation that Lacan locates the point of the
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gaze. In the gaze described by Lacan, not only is the origin of the gaze recognized as
an unoccupiable point since it is marked by an absence, but the impossibility of the
gaze to illuminate the “Real” is also acknowledged. The “Real” of the gaze is shown to
be an illusory construct of the gaze itself, something to which access is denied to the
subject.
The importance of the question: What is being concealed from me?, and the
articulation of the gaze as originating in absence, can be understood by returning to
Hebdige. In Hebdige’s case recognizing the gaze as an unoccupiable point marked by
absence allows the perceived failure of semiotics to prey open the seam between
language and reality to be overcome. Rather than perceiving the seam to be invisible the position demanded by a conception of the gaze as fulfilling a positive function - the
very invisibility of the seam can be understood as marking the originaiy point of the
gaze. Such a recognition illustrates the impossibility of occupying the point of the gaze
since there is no point to be occupied. The invisibility of the seam marks the absence
of a signified, as Copjec describes it, and hence the impossible real promised by the
signifier. In other words the real world of “the people” to which Hebdige desires entry
is an illusory construct of the signifier. The gulf Hebdige perceives as separating the
intellectual from that the “Real” world is nothing more than Hebdige, as a subject,
asking: “What is being concealed from me” in this graphic space? By recognizing this
gulf as an absence, as a lack in the visual field of the gaze, the hysterical desire to peer
beneath the veneer of signification, a capacity promised by the “F’ of the gaze, is
resolved with the truth of cultural forms being shown to reside in its surface topology.
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Concentrating on the surface topological features of such cultural forms as gender
and subculture allows these forms to be seen as “traps for the gaze”(Copjec). It is
important to recognize the double meaning associated with this phrase. We can say
that subculture and gender “trap the gaze”, meaning they attract the gaze by seeming to
provide an instance in which representation seems to ‘generate its own
beyond’.(Copjec) This usage posits the signifiers representing gender and subculture as
providing access to an impossible world in which the gulf separating the signifier from
the real is dissolved, allowing a glimpse beneath the signifier at the signified. This can
be referred to as a trap because the collection of signifiers representing gender or
subculture transfix the gaze, holding it in the joy of interpretation. The gaze is
prevented from moving on, or recognizing what it is looking at as being nothing but a
topological feature of the signification system. The second meaning associated with
the word “traps” describes gender and subculture as providing a moment in which the
gaze is caught off guard, as it were, and revealed as an absence. The graphic
representation of gender and subculture as it is painted by the gaze, provides an
instance in which one is induced to imagine “a gaze outside the field of
representation.’’(Copjec) This is a trap since the gaze is caught in its own action,
revealing that gender and subculture are effect as opposed to features of subjectivity.
Recognizing gender and subculture as traps allows us to move beyond an understanding
of their representation as being indicative either of a real set of social relations or of an
essential quality that orders subjectivity underlying the surface signifiers and towards a
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description that embraces the radical implications of viewing social constructs as the
representation of a lack in the symbolic network.
Viewing gender and subculture as the expression of a lack necessitates that the
“F of the gaze be envisioned as expressing a lack as well. Just as gender and
subculture are radically visual domains where knowledge of the subject cannot be
found, the “F that views subculture must also be recognized as a place in the graphic
space that covers over a lack. The “F cannot be viewed as a place to locate an
unencumbered view of the world. The “I” should be recognized as a signifier standing
in relation to other signifiers in the graphic space of the gaze. This allows knowledge
of the subject whose expressions formulate gender and subculture, and the “I” that
views these formations, to be approached on their own terms and not those of the Big
Other in whose visual space they appear. Failing to recognize the “F as the expression
of a lack produces a visual field in which the gaze functions positively and a positively
functioning gaze has a determining effect on the subject it illuminates.(Copjec), thereby
introducing a political concern into the process of representation.
The Lacanian view locates the subject in the very lack covered over by its
signifier, circumventing the need to develop a political discourse surrounding the
subject’s representation. The political concern shifts to the effect of symbolic networks
in which subjects appear. This enables us to recognize that the subject will always
appear distorted in its representation and it is the job of the researcher to describe how
the experience of the subject becomes distorted, but not the subject. Our descriptions
cannot concentrate on the subject because the subject cannot be described.
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Ethnology’s task is to describe the signifying system that covers over the subject and
makes subjectivity visible and not the appearance of the subject as it is distorted and
condensed by systems o f signification. In this way the subject will always appear as a
lack and not as the result of a gaze. The reason the subject is to be found in this lack is
because this lack in the visual field, in the symbolic network itself, founds the subject.
The subject is established as a being of desire by this lack, by the inability of the
symbolic network to signify reality. Copjec clarifies this when she states:
Lacan locates the cause o f being in the informe: the unformed (that which has no signified,
no significant shape in the visual field) and the inquiry (the question posed to
representations presumed reticence). The subject is the effect o f the impossibility of
seeing what is lacking in the representation, what the subject, therefore wants to
see.(Copjecl994:35)

Literally, the subject as a being of desire is founded on a lack in the signifying network
and not as the realization of a gaze. The subject can never be located in its
representation. The critical reader will quickly realize the suspect implications of
Lacan’s understanding of representation. After all if the subject is not to be found in its
representation than what is to stop us from producing misanthropic ethnography? It
seems that Lacan relativizes the visual field to the point where any representation, no
matter how vulgar, is valid since the subject doesn’t reside in its representation anyway.
The Lacanian response might be to say that a racist or misogynist ethnography is just as
valid as an ethnography that attempts to be non-racist, they are both equally mis-guided
by the desire to capture the subject in the gaze of the Big Other. The analysis of a
racist ethnography would reveal this desire and the affect of representation which is the
goal in the first place.
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This calls into question who benefits from a politics centering on representation.
In Lacanian terms the subject is understood as that which is always being written out of
the visual field of the signifier, as that which is absent in its representation. A politics
centered on the moral and philosophical implications of representing the subject in a
certain light demands the luxury of a transcendent “I” occupying the visual field not
afforded to the anthropologist. Anthropology than, should be recognized as a radically
descriptive field with the objective to describe the visual space in which the subject
experiences itself. Recognizing ethnography as a graphic art in which the visual space
of different subjectivities are described repositions the representations created by the
ethnographer, moving them from fictitious accounts that bring the subject into being, to
depictions of alternative graphic spaces in which subjectivity expresses itself. This
brings attention to the fact that the ‘ethnos’ of ethnography is nothing more than a
surface phenomena of the signifier. The study of culture then is the study of style, with
semiotics providing the interpretive strategy that leads to knowledge o f the effect of a
signifying system on subjectivity. And since as Copjec states, signifiers are material,
‘opaque’ as opposed to translucent, and refer only to other signifiers rather than directly
to a signified(Copjecl994:34), anthropology must take to heart the Lacanian phrase
stating, “Style is the man himself’.
Positioning anthropology as a study in style, or the study of the formal properties
of signifiers as they are arranged by subjects, produces a truly post-structuralist
anthropology in which the authority of the author as the purveyor of meaning is
removed. The anthropologist is taken out of the position of authority because to write
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ethnography is to celebrate the multiple viewpoints from which all graphic spaces can
be seen. This automatically removes the authority of the gaze associated with the
viewpoint of the author. The £T ’ of the author’s gaze is defined by its relationship to
other signifiers and not as an authority on the contents of a graphic space. Recognizing
that there is no authority whose reading of a graphic space can define the meaning of its
content shows how Hebdige started us down the road towards a Lacanian anthropology
but foundered on the shores of an impossible real promised by the signifier. Hebdige
fell into a trap placed by the gaze that promised knowledge of the world beyond the
signifier, a world in which he could identify with the £T ’ of the gaze and have the gulf
separating reality from experience disappear. Hebdige fell for this trap due to his
desire to become a unified subject by occupying the point of the gaze. In Hebdige’s
case the trap laid by the gaze was the commodity form, a signifier that when viewed as
a fetish promises entry into the impossible world of the “Real”, but when viewed as an
opaque signifier that gains meaning in relation to other signifiers and the desire of a
subject promises nothing more than knowledge of its surface and of the gaze that
inscribes it with something more.
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